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ABSTRACT
For more than a century the Supreme Court of the United States has
championed family as an institution of constitutional significance. The Court
recently affirmed this position in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
How to make sense of the Court's invocations? This Article is part of a larger
study that attempts to answer that question. The Article proceeds along two
fronts. The first is constitutional theory. Might family play an institutional
and normative role-like federalism, rights, or divided national power-that
serves as a kind of "Madisonian check" in a constitutionalist order? The
second is history-social, political, and legal. Specifically, what were the
family's form and functions in the westward settlement of the United States in
the nineteenth century?
The argument essentially is this: To solve basic problems of power and
authority, constitutionalism requires institutions of three general types.
Substantively, it needs institutions that can span three dimensions of human
experience: political, economic, and moral. Functionally, it calls for
institutions capable of creating, maintaining, and dissolving (or transforming)
authority. Procedurally, it expects institutions that, in aggregate, promote
"reflection and choice." Conventional wisdom has held that American
constitutional order-through text, formal institutions, and socio-economic
diversity-solved the problems of power and authority. Alexis de Tocqueville,
however, was not convinced. He worried that American institutions and ethos
made the order vulnerable to the centralization of political authority and that
the absence of intermediary institutions, like aristocracy, only enhanced this
vulnerability. Might Tocqueville have overlooked something?
Through an examination of national policy, judicial doctrine, and the
experience of families in the westward territorial expansion of the United
States in the nineteenth century, this Article argues that family was
constitutionally useful. Substantively, family contributed to the political,
economic, and moral constitution of the expanding realm. Functionally, family
assisted in maintaining the order by helping it consolidate and extend
authority westward across the continent. On the moral front, family's role
was, in important respects, dictated by national and territorial policies.
Decisions of the Supreme Court-on issues of common law, statute, and
Constitution-reinforced these policies. Specifically, the order aimed to use a
particular kind of family to settle the West: nuclear, monogamous, and mostly
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white. With respect to political economy, however, family's constitutional
utility was caught in a conflict over the formal commitments of the order. One
conflict involved national policy that vacillated between a liberal-capitalist
(Hamiltonian) conception of political economy and an agrarian-republican
(Jeffersonian) conception. For reasons of interest and sheer numbers, many
families inclined in the agrarian-republican direction. This inclination had
political and social implications of two sorts. First, cutting against
Tocqueville's concern, western families served as a kind of intermediary
institution that aimed to resist the centralist tendencies of Hamiltonian
political economy. Second, those families contributed to a substantial revision
of the social, economic, and political roles of women, providing them a larger
domain for action than had typically existed elsewhere. This revision would
lead eventually to women's suffrage, at first in the West, then eastward, back
to "civilization."
I. FAMILY AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
More than a century ago in a decision approving a legislative divorce
obtained ex parte in the Oregon Territory, the Supreme Court of the United
States ironically pronounced the marital family to be "a relation the most
important, as affecting the happiness of individuals, the first step from
barbarism to incipient civilization, the purest tie of social life, and the true
basis of human progress."' Irony aside, I suspect that most observers today are
inclined to dismiss this kind of talk as a rhetorical anachronism. The problem
with such a dismissal is that we see encomiums to family repeated across the
twentieth century among an array of otherwise incompatible justices.' It is not
1 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1888) (quoting from Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 481, 483
(1863)).
2 There are many twentieth-century cases involving constitutional issues directly implicating the family.
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (O'Connor, J., announcing the judgment of the Court;
Souter, J., concurring; Stevens, J., dissenting); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., for the
Court; Kennedy, J., concurring); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Stevens, J., announcing the
judgment of the Court; Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of
the Court; Stevens, J., concurring; Brennan, J., dissenting; White, J., dissenting); DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court; Brennan, J., dissenting;
Blackmun, J., dissenting); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (O'Connor, J., for the Court); Rivera v.
Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987) (Stevens, J., for the Court; O'Connor, J., concurring; Brennan, J., dissenting);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (O'Connor, J., for the Court); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(White, J., for the Court); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (Brennan, J., for the Court;
O'Connor, J., concurring); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (Burger, C.J., for the Court); Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (Stevens, J., for the Court; White, J., dissenting); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I
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simply that family is an arena for legal conflict with constitutional
implications. Family has also become a basis for constitutional judgment.
What could possibly account for family's ostensible constitutional status,
apart from the fact that the Supreme Court has pronounced it so or that family
is an institution widely used and sometimes liked? That question is the
impetus for this Article, which is part of a larger study of the constitutional
status of the family. I am not interested here in defending any particular tenet
or doctrine of the Court's jurisprudence; I want merely to consider whether the
general strategy of treating family as "constitutional" can make sense.
The standard tools and methods of the constitutional lawyer will not supply
a satisfying answer. It is unlikely, for example, that the text that calls itself
"the Constitution" is adequate, notwithstanding the efforts of Justices Harlan
3
and Douglas4 to employ it. Nor can original meaning-still less, framers'
(1983) (Brennan, J., for the Court); Mills v. Halbuetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., for the Court;
O'Connor, J., concurring); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Blackmun, J., for the Court); Lassiter v.
Dept. of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (Stewart, J., for the Court; Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (Burger, C.J., for the Court); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981) (Burger, C.J., for the Court; Powell, J., concurring; Stevens, J., concurring); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979) (Burger, C.J., for the Court; Stewart, J., concurring); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(Powell, J., for the Court; Stewart, J., dissenting; Stevens, J., dissenting); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374
(1978) (Marshall, J., for the Court; Stewart, J., concurring; Powell, J., concurring); Lalli v. Lalli. 439 U.S. 259
(1978) (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court; Stewart, J., concurring; Blackmun, J., concurring;
Brennan, J., dissenting); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (Marshall, J., for the Court); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court; Brennan, J., concurring);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (Powell, J., for the Court); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)
(Powell, J., for the Court); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (Douglas, J., for the Court);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (Stewart, J., for the Court); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973) (per curiam); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Burger, C.J., for the Court); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (White, J., for the Court); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (Black, J., for
the Court; Harlan, J., concurring; Brennan, J., dissenting); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(Harlan, J., for the Court; Douglas, J., concurring); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (Douglas, J., for the
Court); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Warren, C.J., for the Court); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (Douglas, J., for the Court; Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 523 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (Rutledge, J., for the Court); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, ex rel Williamson 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Douglas, J., for the Court); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (McReynolds, J., for the Court); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (McReynolds, J.,
for the Court). This list is not exhaustive. It excludes, for example, most of the cases involving the right to
abortion as well as those involving sexual equality, divorce, testimonial privilege, jurisdiction, confrontation of
witnesses, enforcement of judicial orders, and removal of children from foster care, despite the fact that such
cases frequently have implications for familial life.
3 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539, 549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (locating a right of marital
privacy in, inter alia, the Third and Fourth Amendments).
4 His famous use of "penumbras" and "emanations" proceeds initially from "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965). On his account, the First
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intentions-comprehensively do so! As I consider below,6 common law has
something to offer, but it too seems insufficient standing alone.' These
inadequacies may incite some scholars to conclude that the Court's
jurisprudence of family has been illicit. I think such a rejection is too quick.
For one thing, other sources of constitutional meaning are available, any one of
which might make its own claim to authority. Possible sources include
tradition," retroduction of principle from doctrine,9 structure (institutional' ° or
textual"), "spirit" (or purpose),12 contemporary ethos,'3 norms of civilized
nations, 4 and natural law (or right). 5 I do not critically evaluate these sourcesand methods here, although I acknowledge the need eventually to do so.
Amendment's right of assembly connotes association, including intimate associations, one of which is marital
family; and the Third Amendment's prohibition of quartering soldiers in time of peace, the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment's Self-
Incrimination Clause all presuppose "the sanctity of a man's home," which presumably might house not only
"a man" but a family as well. Id. at 484.
5 I have argued elsewhere that at least some of the Constitution's proponents viewed "republican
family" as part of a social order on which the successful operation of the order depended. See Mark E.
Brandon, Family at the Birth of American Constitutional Order, 77 TEx. L. REV. 1195, 1221-26 (1999). The
evidence, however, is not voluminous.
6 See infra Part III.C.1.
7 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-26 (1989); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
8 See Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. at 110. For a defense of
tradition generally as an interpretive source, see Anthony Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J.
1029 (1990). Justice Douglas's final paragraph in Griswold v. Connecticut may implicitly rest on intuitions of
the sort that Kronman expresses. 381 U.S. at 486. Marriage, wrote Douglas, is "older than the Bill of
Rights-older than our political parties, older than our school system." Id. It promotes "a way of life,"
which is one reason he called it "noble." Id.
9 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (Cardozo, J., for the Court). The term "retroduction"
comes from Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 763 (1980).
10 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
11 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
12 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (invoking "penumbras" and "emanations" for purposes behind particular
textual guarantees of rights). Cf. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (asserting that "the spirit...
is to be collected chiefly from [the] words" (quoting from Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 122,
202 (1819))).
13 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX.
L.J. 433 (1986).
14 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (invoking "civilized standards" of "decency" and "the
dignity of man"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., for the Court) (specifying
the values of "English speaking peoples"); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 15,551) (Story, J.).
15 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388, 398 (1798); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-16 (1975) (discussing natural rights as a source for higher law);
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 286 (1985). Cf United
States v. Marshall, 908 F. 2d 1312, 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting) (noting common
characteristics of natural law and pragmatism).
20031
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
Instead, I assert that, if there is to be a satisfying justification for family's
constitutional status, it must ultimately press on two fronts, one normative, the
other empirical. Without claiming to offer a comprehensive answer to the
question of family's status, this Article proceeds on both fronts.
On the normative front, it is useful, perhaps essential, to take up the theory
that underwrites the constitutional enterprise in the first place:
constitutionalism. What problems does it aim to address? What are its
elements? What norms and practices does it require? On the empirical front,
we should examine family, not merely as an idea but also as a working
institution. What forms does it take? What relations does it entail? Do its
functions make it useful for a constitutionalist order?
Briefly, my analysis unfolds in the following way: Constitutionalism is
concerned with problems of power and authority. To solve those problems, it
needs institutions of three general types. Substantively, it requires institutions
that can span three dimensions of human experience-political, economic, and
moral. Functionally, it calls for institutions capable of creating, maintaining,
and dissolving (or transforming) authority. Procedurally, it expects
institutions that, in aggregate, promote "reflection and choice."
Conventional wisdom (or hubris) has held that American constitutional
order-through its Constitution, its institutional arrangement, and its socio-
economically diverse society-solved the problems of power and authority.
Alexis de Tocqueville, however, was not convinced. 6 He claimed, among
other things, that simultaneous commitments to liberalism and democracy in
the United States made the order especially vulnerable to the centralization of
political authority. One reason for this vulnerability was the scarcity of
"intermediary" institutions-like an aristocracy-capable of resisting a
concentration of power. This tendency threatened the order's ability to sustain
itself as a constitutionalist enterprise.
Might Tocqueville have overlooked something? Might family perform in
ways that reinforce constitutionalism? From the standpoint of procedure, it is
not clear that family has much to contribute. With respect to substance,
however, family can span all three of the posited dimensions of human
experience-political, economic, and moral. This is not to suggest that any
particular iteration of family will necessarily do so, nor that a constitutionalist
order must include a particular form of family. It is only to propose that if
16 See infra Part ll.B.
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family is capable of promoting some version of the three substantive
dimensions, it might be constitutionally useful.
Can it do more? Specifically, can it also meet constitutionalism's
functional requirements-to create, maintain, and dissolve (or transform)
authority and power? In previous work, I examined how a new form of family
arose in eighteenth-century British North America, antagonistic to and
subversive of aristocratic privilege and practices, and how it contributed to
political events and ideologies that led North American colonies to secede
from Britain and establish a republican political system." In short, in the
colonial context, eighteenth-century families functioned in creative and
transformative ways, helping to dissolve relations with an old political order
and create a new one.
In the present Article, I examine a later time and in some respects a
different sort of family. I focus, specifically, on families in the westward
territorial expansion of the United States in the nineteenth century." I
conclude that these families did two significant things. Substantively, they
contributed in fundamental ways to the political, economic, and moral
constitution of the expanding realm. Functionally, too, they performed a
constitutionally useful role. They differed, however, from their colonial
forebears, for their role was neither creative nor directly transformative, but a
maintaining role that helped the regime consolidate power and extend its
geographic range across a continent.
Here, briefly, is the evidence for these claims: National policy profited
from family's political, economic, and moral dimensions. On the political and
economic fronts, however, there was a complication: Nineteenth-century
American culture housed at least two distinct conceptions of political
economy-one agrarian-republican (espoused by Thomas Jefferson), the other
liberal-capitalist (whose articulate early proponent was Alexander Hamilton).
17 Brandon, supra note 5, at 1206-10.
18 There is a problematic ambiguity in the word "westward," not least because the West has been a
moving target in the history of the United States. There was a time, of course, when upstate New York and the
rolling hills of Virginia and most of Pennsylvania were West. Thereafter, as Frederick Jackson Turner
famously recited, the West progressed beyond the Alleghenies to Kentucky and Tennessee, into the Ohio
Valley and the Old Northwest, beyond the Chattahoochee River in the deep South, past the Mississippi River
to a vast prairie, and so on until the nation devoured much of a continent. See the essays collected in
FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1996). Generalizing about such a
sizable space and time is tricky, but I hope here to hold onto an ambiguous "West" in order to try to tease out
some themes related to constitutional structure and change. One thing I do not consider in this Article is the
implication of national policy of territorial settlement for native tribes. That issue is part of the larger study.
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Each conception posited its own values and its own place for family. 9 The
U.S. policy of territorial expansion embodied the tensions between these two
conceptions, though it did not attempt to reconcile them."' In short, Congress
pursued both conceptions simultaneously. This ecumenical embrace, however,
did not suppress conflict entirely, even if it did dampen it. For one thing, there
was a persistent political cleavage between homesteaders and speculators.
This division, which grew out of competing material interests that were tied to
conflicting notions of political economy, pitted an image of the familial farm
against an image of an individualist market in free labor. The cleavage was
visible not only in Congress, but also on Western turf.2' For another, national
policy toward settlement was inextricably bound to growing sectional conflict
over the status and fate of slavery in the order. On the frontier, this conflict
pitted two versions of the agrarian family against each other. One was the
slaveholding household, which viewed its landed entitlement as prior to the
nation. The other was a white, non-slaveholding household that traced its
22landed entitlement to the national government.
Even on the eve of the Civil War, members of Congress and the president
were engaged in political pugilism on both the class-based front and the
sectional front.23 Despite the adoption of the Republican Party's Homestead
Act after Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860, which would seem to have been
a victory for white homesteaders against both speculators and slavery (or, if
not slavery, against black settlement), Western agrarians criticized national
24policy as wed to capitalism. Amid all the commotion, however, Congress
was clear and consistent about one thing: Family's function was to maintain
(and extend) political dominion into the territories and across the continent.
Would family comply with Congress's expectations? First, would the
experience of families on the frontier exhibit the maintaining function
presupposed by congressional policy, or would it reveal attempts to challenge
the order through acts of creation or dissolution, as occurred around the time of
the American Revolution? Second, would these families not simply authorize
power, but constrain it as well, particularly against the tendencies Tocqueville
saw as endemic to American constitutional order?
19 See infra Part lII.A.
20 See infra Part II.B.1.
21 See infra Part III.1.
22 See infra Part I1.B.2.
23 See infra Part 111.B.3.
24 See infra Part 111.B.4.
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Answers to these questions would depend partly on family's function along
other dimensions of constitutionalism-especially the moral dimension. We
see the family's moral dimension on two fronts. One, grounded in the ethos
and practices of the culture at large, involved the role of women in the
domestic sphere. In short, women's work was not only to maintain the
household in a material sense, but to exercise responsibility for the education
of children. This responsibility was both intellectual and moral. Combined
with assumptions about women's innately superior capacity for moral
judgment and behavior, the educative function pictured wives and mothers as
guardians of civilization in society.25
The second front on which the moral dimension was implicated was in the
courts, specifically, for my purposes here, the Supreme Court. The Court's
decisions, in a variety of doctrinal domains, wrote family into the Constitution
of the nation. They did so, in part, by formalizing and in some ways
nationalizing the commitment to common law. A substantial portion of this
commitment, of course, entailed norms regulating the options of women-
especially married women-in the economic sphere. Legal constraints on
wives' economic capacities tended to reinforce their educative role as mothers.
Thus, growing out of these economic concerns were two basic issues, both of
which appeared in cases arising from settlement of the frontier. One was
whether the proper constitutional conception of family was as a prepolitical,
prelegal institution or as a civil institution created by and subject to law. The
second involved polygamy. This latter set of cases enabled the Court to reflect
on the form and function of family. The proper form, the Court insisted, was
monogamous. The function, which grew out of this form, was moral. The
morality of family concerned not only the internal dynamics of familial life,
but also family's role in reinforcing a particular kind of morality in the larger• 26
society.
Family's moral and economic dimensions integrated into the political,
especially in the territories and new states of the West.27 Western families did
help maintain and extend the authority of the nation across the continent. They
were both essential and useful to this task. They were essential for two
reasons. First, agriculture was the primary mode of production on the frontier;
second, the means for pursuing agriculture made family, not the individual, the
25 See infra Part III.C.2.
26 See infra Part III.C.I.
27 See infra Part III.D.
2003]
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basic unit capable of material self-sufficiency. Families were useful to the
task, because connections among families created communities, which were
the basis for a rudimentary form of politics, which in turn was the foundation
for political control of the territories and their admission into the union.
If families helped maintain the order, however, they also changed it. There
were several reasons they did so. Environmental exigencies, the weakness of
law, and the paucity of established social ties permitted (in some respects
required) changes in family. Among the changes were subtle alterations in
relations between wives and husbands. It would be a mistake to make too
much of the significance (or longevity) of some of these alterations, but it is
fair to say that they helped produce two consequences that were relevant to
constitutional order. First, families in the Western territories helped produce a
political movement whose aim was to challenge the Hamiltonian conception of
political economy. Tocqueville would have been interested in this
development, but he would not have been surprised that the movement
ultimately failed. Second, alterations of roles within the Western family
helped revise people's conception of who could be a political member of the
constitutional order. In short, Western women exploited their moral role,
expanded their economic role, and were much less excluded from a political
role than were their sisters back East. As a consequence, women began to
acquire some basic rights of citizenship. This Western innovation would
eventually echo eastward, beyond the frontier, back to "civilization."
II. CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is a concept capable of various meanings. As I use the
term, it is not equivalent to explanations or descriptions of doctrinal glosses
that judges have placed on a constitution; for it is not an analytic account of the
practice of judicial review. Nor, on the other hand, is it essentially an attempt
"to remedy a central problem of liberal political theory by constraining the
judiciary sufficiently to prevent judicial tyranny." 2 Nor, to press the point
further, is it restricted to liberal forms of government, though many liberal
polities would qualify in various respects as constitutionalist.' 9
28 Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784-85 (1983).
29 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (defining constitutionalism as "the theory
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Constitutionalism is a political theory concerned with the architectural
structure and basic values of society and of government. It aims to make the
world comprehensible and, to some degree, controllable. Historically, it is
preoccupied with the problem of power, particularly the power of those who
would rule others, especially when that rule might be arbitrary. To solve these
problems, constitutionalism has three sets of needs or requirements.
First, in substantive terms, it requires institutions that span three
dimensions of human experience. One dimension is political, implicating the
allocation of benefits and burdens among people in society, the articulation of
norms for human behavior, and the processes by which formal decisions are
made. Another is economic. This dimension is concerned with the production,
distribution, and exchange of material goods and materially consequential
services. The third dimension is moral. It pertains to the norms by which
people evaluate the substantive value or rightness of human action. In
conjunction with one another, these dimensions-political, economic, and
moral-are concerned with "ways of life." There might be many such ways-
for societies, for groups, or for individuals-consistent with con-
stitutionalism. 3°
Second, in functional terms, constitutionalism needs institutions capable of
doing three things: creating, maintaining, and dissolving (or fundamentally
altering) constitutional orders.3 This set of needs makes a written constitution
that the majority must be restrained to protect individual rights"); cf. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 45-47 (Walter F. Murphy et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995) (for whom constitutionalism resembles a
system of liberal rights, whose grundnorm is human dignity, to check democracy).
30 For present purposes, we may hold open the question of whether constitutionalist ways must be
compatible with a comprehensive vision of "the good life," in Aristotelian, Thomistic, or other terms.
Compare SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984), with ROBERT P. GEORGE,
MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993). My intuition is that they need not be;
in fact, there may be advantage in incompatibility.
31 One might imagine that creation and dissolution are essentially about change, while maintenance is
about preservation. This view, however, is too narrow. For example, one might create or dissolve for
purposes of preservation; moreover, for reasons both Edmund Burke and Charles Darwin understood, in order
to preserve, one sometimes must change. Burke was a "conservative" political theorist in at least two
respects: He insisted that the aim of politics should be to preserve the existing order; and he was skeptical of
systematic philosophies that advocated revolutionary change. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Conor Cruise O'Brien ed., 1969). Burke perceived, however, the need for political
orders to change in order to preserve themselves. Hence, he supported moderate reform and viewed the
practice of politics as a kind of adaptation. See SELECTED LETTERS OF EDMUND BURKE 5-6 (Harvey C.
Mansfield, Jr. ed., 1984). Darwin's theory of evolution, of course, posited that the survival of a species
depended on an innate drive to reproduce, which, unconsciously over time, promoted the adaptation of the
species to environmental and other exigencies. See CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (New York
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especially useful, maybe essential. It also explains the utility of a theory
positing sovereignty in "the people," as distinct from government.32 But
constitutionalism might require other, more ordinary institutions that can
perform one or more of the three functions.
Third, in terms of method or procedure, it aims at authorizing and
constraining power through what Alexander Hamilton called "reflection and
choice., 3 3  This aim suggests the primacy of principle and the deficiency of
mere force as bases for political action, and it implies the importance of
authority and respect for limits. "Authority" connotes the justified exercise of
power. "Limits" may entail the exercise of power through established,
rational procedures, through the rational pursuit of specified ends, or through
respect for rights; it may also make institutional balance desirable. The
preoccupation with authority and limits makes law an attractive, perhaps
essential, element of any constitutionalist regime. But constitutionalism and
rule of law are not coextensive, for reasons that Vladimir Putin's proclaimed
aspiration for a "dictatorship of law" may help clarify.34
B. An American Dilemma
As indicated above, a constitutionalist order may configure institutions,
norms, and practices in a variety of ways. We can quickly recite some of the
conspicuous institutions that the Constitution of the United States crafted or
presupposed. First, political authority resided ultimately in the people. As a
matter of constitutional creation or dissolution, this notion was consistent with
University Press, 1988) (1859). Consequently, preservation and change (even transformative change) are
elements of or possibilities in all three constitutionalist functions.
32 From a written constitution and popular sovereignty, a working definition of constitutionalism might
follow: a theory of the institutions and values of a type of political "enterprise" in which "(1) people, or 'a
people,' (2) self-consciously attempt (3) to conceive the design for a new political world, (4) to embody that
design in some sort of text, and (5) to implement it in the world." MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD:
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 10 (1998). My primary concern in this Article is with
institutional structure, not texts; that shift in focus is not an implicit repudiation of my claim that
constitutionalism requires some sort of text.
33 THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at I (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
34 See JEFFERY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA 607 (2002).
35 1 do not attempt here to catalogue or classify particular orders as constitutionalist (or not). Suffice it to
say that the United States is such an order, though one that tends toward liberalism in important but contestable
respects. Plainly, the United States is not the only model, but it is one from which we might draw tantalizing
lessons, even as we should be cautious about generalizing from any conclusions we reach. With respect to the
family, one thing is worth noting: To the extent that the United States is a liberal regime, we might expect
family's constitutional role (as compared, say, with the role of individuals) to be circumscribed, especially in
light of the thin textual foundation for family in the Constitution itself.
[Vol. 52
HOME ON THE RANGE
the sovereignty of the people (as opposed to God or monarch or state).16 As a
matter of constitutional maintenance, the notion embodied the republican
principle that rulers derive their authority, directly or indirectly, from those
who are ruled.37 Second, aristocratic modes of social organization and political
entitlement were expressly repudiated, at least to the extent that such modes
38entailed privileges of citizenship or other formal entitlements. Third, and
following from the first two, the basic mode of political decision was
democratic (or relatively so), both in the system of electoral representation and
in the operation of legislative bodies." Fourth, formal political power was
divided between the states and nation; and, within the national government,
functions were divided among distinct institutions, whose interconnected
authority and functions were finely specified and calibrated. 4° Fifth, the
Constitution imposed express limits on actions of the United States4' and the
several states.42 Sixth, the order was a "legal" system in at least three respects:
Its binding norms were produced by authoritative, representative institutions;
those norms were enforced by judges possessing comprehensive judicial
powers; and the system of legal enforcement was guarded by a partially
autonomous professional class: lawyers.43 Seventh, at least for James Madison,
a sprawling, diverse, and dissonant population reinforced restraint in the
national system by making agreement on national policy more difficult."
Since the founding, many Americans have been satisfied that this system-
putting liberalism and democracy in tense union with each other-solved the
problems of power and authority, producing a balanced order capable of vigor,
constraint, stability, and long life. Without denigrating many of the advantages
of the American order, Alexis de Tocqueville worried. The basic problem he
saw was the tendency, inherent in the operational logic of any democratic
political system, toward centralization of power in the nation-state. This
problem was exacerbated by two distinctive characteristics of American
society: the absence of significant intermediary institutions and an excessive
tendency among Americans to "privatize" their lives. Thus, he worried that
36 U.S. CONST. pmbl; id. amend. X.
31 Id. art. I; id., art. I1; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 37, 39 (James Madison).
38 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 4.
39 Id. art. 1; id. art. 1l.
40 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39, 51 (James Madison).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Bill of Rights, added later, enhanced substantially the rights one could
claim against the national government.
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. art. IV.
43 Id. art. Il1; THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
44 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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even the baroque architecture of the American system might not suffice to
resist democracy's centralizing tendency. "Complicated systems repel [a
democratic people, who are] pleased to imagine a great nation in which all of
the citizens resemble a single model and are directed by a single power.,
45
On Tocqueville's account, the mechanism for centralization is twofold.
The first is the potency of the concept of equality undergirding democracy-
equality at least among those who count as full citizens. Second, and related to
the first, is the normative and emotional power of individualism. Thus,
Tocqueville rejected the conventional story Americans told about themselves:
that the Constitution presides over an uneasy marriage of liberalism and
democracy, spawning a system in which competing interests of collective and
individual are balanced and the power of government is diffuse and
constrained. The marriage of democracy and liberalism is not tense at all, he
claimed, for the two share a basic tendency.46
One characteristic of aristocratic systems, said Tocqueville, is the presence
of "secondary" or "intermediate" powers. The social virtue of these powers
is that they mediate the relation between the state and its subjects or citizens.
Democracy, for reasons of history and principle, rejects aristocratic privilege.
This rejection inclines the mind of the democratic citizen to a jealous
antagonism toward any policy that treats people differently. The version of
law this calls for is a general law of uniform application. The kind of society it
tends to produce is a mass society, composed of free and equal individuals.
This state of affairs might seem to suggest a regime of happy rights-
holders, governed by law, but, on Tocqueville's account, it does not. For one
thing, in such a society the individual, "having become like all the others, is
lost in the crowd, and one no longer perceives [anything] but the vast and
magnificent image of the people itself. 48 For another:
This immortal hatred, more and more afire, which animates
democratic peoples against the slightest privileges, particularly
favors the gradual concentration of all political rights in the hands of
the sole representative of the state. The sovereign [state], being
necessarily above all citizens and uncontested, does not excite the
45 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA pt. iv, ch. 2 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000).
46 2 id.
47 2 id. at 640-43.
48 2 id.
[Vol. 52
HOME ON THE RANGE
envy of any of them, and each believes he deprives his equals of all
the prerogatives he concedes to it.
4 9
Any residual sovereignty the people ostensibly possess is no check against this
tendency. "Americans believe that in each state the social power ought to
emanate directly from the people; but once that power is constituted, they
imagine so to speak no limits to it; they willingly recognize that it has the right
to do everything."5° Nor does a system of general laws of uniform application
supply a sufficient check. "[E]very central government adores uniformity;
uniformity spares it the examination of an infinity of details with which it
would have to occupy itself if it were necessary to make a rule for men, instead
of making all men pass indiscriminately under the same rule." For these
reasons, "[e]very central power ... loves equality and favors it; for equality
singularly facilitates the action of such a power, extends it, and secures it."'"
Two ironies follow from Tocqueville's critique. From the standpoint of
liberalism, a society of individuals threatens to submerge individuals. From
the standpoint of democracy, a political system whose authority ostensibly
rests on the collective people challenges the very limits that, on a
constitutionalist understanding, were an impetus for creating the system, thus
undermining the aims of the sovereign (people, not state) and weakening its
residual power. The moral and material economies of egoistic competition and
acquisition, which were unusually well developed in the United States, only
make matters worse. The equal inhabitants of democratic countries, said
Tocqueville, "willingly fall back on themselves and consider themselves in
isolation., s2 They are so preoccupied with self and private gain that "hardly
any energy or leisure remains to each man for political life."53 Hence, they
find it difficult "to tear themselves away from their particular [private] affairs
to occupy themselves with common [public] affairs; their natural inclination is
to abandon the care of the latter to the sole visible and permanent
representative of collective interests, which is the state.",54  The ethos of
competition that underwrites private activity tends in the same direction.
Because "no one is obliged to lend his force to those like him ... each is at
49 2 id. pt. iv, ch. 3, at 645
50 2 id. pt. iv, ch. 2.
51 2 id. pt. iv, ch. 3, at 645.
52 2 id. at 643.
53 2 id.
54 2 id at 643. As I suggested above, Madison saw these same aspects of social life as virtues, from a
constitutionalist perspective. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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once independent and weak., 5  This conflict has psychological ramifications.
Independence engenders a sense of "confidence and pride."" Weakness, on
the other hand, incites a desire for "outward help," which he cannot expect
from his fellows because they are his constant competitors; thus, "he naturally
turns his regard to the immense being that rises alone in the midst of universal
debasement. His needs and above all his desires constantly lead him back
toward it, and in the end he views it as the unique and necessary support for
individual weakness.,
57
This is a bleak picture. Tocqueville himself conceded that these tendencies
were not inexorable. "I only maintain that in our day a secret force constantly
develops them in the human heart, and that not to stop them is enough for them
to fill it up. ''58 But he did not see the means for overcoming the tendencies.
Perhaps, however, he underestimated an institution in which he was actually
quite interested: the family. Tocqueville himself noted that, while
"[d]emocracy loosens social bonds . . . it tightens natural ones. It brings
relatives together at the same time that it separates citizens."59  He could
comprehend how this cohesion might be socially useful as a vehicle for
promoting "good morals," as a refuge from the alienation incited by American
economic order, or as indirectly promoting material prosperity, 60 but he did not
conceive that, as an intermediary association, it might have constitutionalist
uses as well.
C. Family
It is difficult (perhaps because it is too easy) to speak of "family"
generically. As a sociological matter, there are many forms of family in the
world, across a variety of continua-marital and nonmarital, nuclear and
extended, reproductive and childless, monogamous and plural, heterosexual
and same-sex, patriarchal and egalitarian. It is possible, however, to identify
particular aspects of human experience that have fallen linguistically within the
term "family" and have marked it as significant.
One such aspect is reproduction, which is essential to the survival of the
species. Until recently in human history, all that has been required to
55 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 45, at 644.
56 2 id.
57 2 id. pt. iv, ch. 3.
58 2 id.
'9 2 id. pt. iii, ch. 8.
60 2 id. pt. iii, chs. 10-11; 2 id. pt. ii, ch. 2.
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perpetrate reproduction has been a copulative act that produces a zygote (then
embryo, then fetus), a successful birth, and the presence of one or more
persons willing and able to care for the child until s/he is mature enough to do61
so. Thus, while it presupposed a kind of heterosexual union, if not a
heterosexual orientation on the part of both partners, it did not require a
perpetuation of the union, much less exclusivity; certainly, it did not require a
continuing, formally monogamous, nuclear family of the sort that includes a
mother, father, and child. Although some people in our own time may doubt
that mere sex rises to the level of a constitutional interest, surely it is
constitutive of the species and of social life in nontrivial ways. To say this, of
course, is not to resolve the question of whether procreation should be subject
to social regulation, exempt from such regulation, or both.62
Beyond the physical survival of the species, there are other ways in which
family has been constitutionally consequential-ways that map the three
63substantive dimensions of constitutionalism. One, as we have seen, is
economic: not sexual reproduction but material production. Long before
Friedrich Engels reminded us of this aspect of familial life, 4 Aristotle noted
that a central function of the household-consisting of a man, one or more
women, children, and slaves-was to promote material well being. Its
61organization and purpose aimed at satisfying its members' daily needs.
Hence, the ancient Greek name for household, oikos, became the root for the
English word "economy."6 Although women had a critical role in
maintaining the Aristotelian household and were superior to children and
61slaves, it was clear that Aristotle posited man as superior to all three.
61 Today, reproductive technologies permit dispensing with copulation as a trigger for procreation.
62 The Supreme Court has embraced the third option, but did not begin to focus systematically on this
aspect of familial life until well into the twentieth century. This timing places the Court's treatment of this
issue beyond the scope of this Article.
63 In this section, I consider ideas of Aristotle and John Locke. I do so, not to reify or entrench their
conceptions (which in any event conflict with one another), but because they dealt with family in ways that are
relevant to constitutionalism. My discussion here draws on notions explored in Brandon, supra note 5, at
1202-06.
64 FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE IN THE LIGHT OF
THE RESEARCHES OF LEWIS H. MORGAN (International Publishers 1972) (1891).
65 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, at lii (Benjamin Jowett trans., Max Lerner ed., 1942).
66 For a nice treatment of the political economy of the ancient Greek conception of household, see
WILLIAM JAMES BOOTH, HOUSEHOLDS: ON THE MORAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE ECONOMY 1-93 (1993).
67 ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at I.ii (quoting Homer: "Each one gives law to his children and to his
wives"); id. at l.xii ("[T]he male is by nature fitter for command than the female."); id. at I.xiii (quoting
Sophocles: "'Silence is a woman's glory,' but this is not equally the glory of man").
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Philosophically, temporally, and culturally closer to American nationhood,
John Locke retained, revised, and rejected various aspects of Aristotle's theory.
Locke had a substantially more complex (and ambivalent) conception of
political economy. One reason for this fact may be that he stood at a critical
juncture in the development of the English system. Looking in one direction,
he could see a long tradition of agrarianism, whose fate had been recently
sealed by the policy of enclosure. Looking in another direction, he could see
emerging-from English colonialism, from her mercantile policy of the
previous century, and from the unconscious development of domestic shops
and enterprises-new forms of commercial enterprise that constituted the
crude foundation for capitalist norms and institutions." Regardless of his
conflict on this score, family was not a prominent part of Locke's conception
of economy.
Locke focused instead on a different dimension of familial life: the moral
education of children. Aristotle had argued, "inasmuch as every family is part
of a state, and these relationships [between husband and wife, parent and child]
are the parts of a family, and the virtue of the part must have regard to the
virtue of the whole, women and children must be trained by education with an
eye to the constitution." That is, women and children must be educated so as
to integrate them and their relevant "virtues" harmoniously into the state.69
Locke did not disagree substantially with this way of framing the matter, nor
even with the specification of virtues.70 He did disagree, however, about who
would control the education through which the relevant virtues would be
instilled.
Aristotle had posited that, because the purpose of education was to prepare
citizens and others to take their proper place in the constitution of the state, it
must be the province of the state.7 Locke had a different idea. The state that
Locke presupposed was a limited government. It was limited by the purposes
for which it was established (the protection of life, liberty, and estate);7 ' by its
commitment to the rule of law (which required that government legislate
68 One can see this conflict in modem scholarship on Locke. Compare, e.g., NEAL WOOD, JOHN LOCKE
AND AGRARIAN CAPITALISM (1984), with C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
69 ARISTOTLE, supra note 65, at l.xiii.
70 For Aristotle, the virtues relevant to citizenship included temperance, courage, and justice. Id. at l.xii.
In sum, these virtues involved the preeminence of the rational and deliberative faculties over the nonrational.
Id. at l.xiii.
71 See id. at V.ix, VIII.
72 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 123, 131 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980).
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generally, for the public good, and in accordance with the majoritarian
principle);" by its presumption that state and society were distinct (with
society possessing a residual power to resist arbitrary government);74 and by its
distinction between public and private (with respect to the ownership and use
of property and with respect to the function of family). 5 Locke's notion of
familial privacy focused on the child. Family's primary function, said Locke,
was to nurture the child: to protect him physically, to provide for him
materially, and to educate him intellectually and morally. It was the business
of parents to bring the child into reason, to make him a self-sufficient, self-
limiting creature." This was an enterprise in which both father and mother
shared. At one point, Locke insisted that each had an "equal" share in the
business.77 Plainly, however, he did not intend this equality to be enforced
rigorously, as he preserved Aristotle's primacy of the patriarch."
The purpose for family's educative function was not simply for the child's
profit. The purpose was also political, for the advantage of society. This aim
was to prepare the child for citizenship in a regime characterized by a kind of
democracy and liberty under law.7 9 Here, as with his discussion of parental
authority, Locke embraced masculine superiority, as his citizens were
uniformly male. Patriarchy aside, this arrangement reinforced Locke's limited
government in two ways. First, it made for citizens who were capable,
knowledgeable, and not beholden to others-citizens who were, in short, self-
governing. Second, the delegation of educative authority to parents meant that
the state could not over determine the values of society that served as a check
on the power of the state.
III. NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
A. Political Economies: Jeffersonian Republicanism and Hamiltonian
Liberalism
As we saw above, James Madison claimed that the proper structure of
government and constitution of society in the United States would promote the
" Id. §§ 96-98, 124-25, 131.
74 Id. §§ 240-43.
71 Id. §§ 25-95.
76 Id. §§ 55-65.
"7 Id. § 52.
78 Id. §§ 82, 86.
79 Id. §§ 55-65. See also id. §§ 87-90, 92-93, 95, 127-31.
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common good. s° He did not conceive, however, that the system would run
smoothly or that threats to the stability of the order would be absent. One of
the chief threats involved the relation between property and government. It
was not that Madison disbelieved in the desirability of private ownership of
property. Nor was it that he conceived of no role for government in the
protection of ownership. But Madison lived at a time that permitted him to see
some of the fruits of Lockean liberalism. He saw the development of
commerce from a simple mercantile system to one that was dynamic and
complex. Even in its rudimentary form, the capitalism that Madison saw by
the end of the eighteenth century was marked by material diversification and
social differentiation.
Thus, while Locke could see in property a reason for drawing people
together into political society for mutual advantage, Madison saw property
driving them apart:
The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of
property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity
of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of
Government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties
of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds
of property immediately results: and from the influence of these on
the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a
81division of the society into different interests and parties.
Such divisions, said Madison, inflame passion, promote injustice, produce
instability, and threaten to extinguish popular government itself. His familiar
solution was not to posit a vision of the good life, but, as we have seen, to
construct a political apparatus that could mitigate the debilitating effects of
faction. Madison understood that structure alone would not prevent conflict
over the ownership and regulation of property. Nor would it preclude
competition among various forms of property. He imagined, however, that the
extended republic could knit together a diverse country full of tensions.
But divisions ran deep. One reason for their depth was that certain forms
of property or of enterprise were integral to ways of life that in turn bore upon
the political constitution of the nation. And family was implicated in all three.
One constitutive division-which has persisted for much of the life of the
nation-was that between agriculture on the one hand and commerce and
80 See supra Part ll.B.
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 43 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
[Vol. 52
HOME ON THE RANGE
industry on the other. The stakes of this division were apparent, from the
earliest years of the republic, in the political thought of Thomas Jefferson and
Alexander Hamilton. A comprehensive comparison of the two is beyond the
scope of this Article, but a sketch of themes and tendencies can help lay the
groundwork for comprehending the conflicted character of national policy of
westward settlement.
As many scholars have pointed out, Thomas Jefferson was a progenitor of a• 82
strand of American ethos known as agrarian republicanism. At its heart was
the Aristotelian notion that the foundation for political order was social. That
is, the form and character of society were constitutive of polity. For that
reason, republican government could flourish only under social conditions
congenial to the virtues that collective self-government required. Principal
virtues were independence and self-sufficiency. Frequently, these traits were
combined under a single rubric: manliness. Almost always in this context, a
"man" was not a detached individual but a person bound to soil and
community, usually through the institution of the family. A man needed
enough land to support himself and his family."
But this was a particular sort of family-republican, not aristocratic-that
suggested a particular relation to the land. In A Summary View of the Rights of
British America, Jefferson depicted the historical roots of this theme.84 "t[Olur
ancestors," he said, like "their Saxon ancestors" before them:
possessed a right which nature has given to all men, of departing
from the country in which chance, not choice, has placed them, of
going in quest of new habitations, and of there establishing new
societies, under such laws and regulation as to them shall seem most
likely to promote public happiness
The Normans and their progeny destroyed that freedom, imposing instead a
yoke of feudal burdens. "Our Saxon ancestors held their lands ... in absolute
dominion, disencumbered with any superior . . . ,,. Feudal relations were
imposed by "William, the Norman," but they did not negate the original,
allodial ground for landed tenure in England, which remained at common law
82 Frederick C. Prescott, Introduction to Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, in ALEXANDER
HAMILTON AND THOMAS JEFFERSON lxii (Frederick C. Prescott ed., 1934).
83 Brandon, supra note 5, at 1215-16; Prescott, supra note 82, at lxii.
84 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS, 105-22 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
15 Id. at 105-06.
86 Id. at 118.
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even as subsequent kings and Parliaments attempted to usurp it. In any event,
"America was not conquered by William the Norman, nor its lands
surrendered to him, or any of his successors.""7 "America was conquered, and
her settlements made . . . at the expence of individuals .... "" not of the
Crown or Parliament or "the British public."8 9 If Americans have seemed to
acquiesce in the notion that the Crown dispensed their land, it is merely
because they were "farmers, not lawyers." 9
Two years later as a member of Virginia's legislature, Jefferson sponsored
two measures designed to shed the Norman yoke. One abolished entail, a
condition on property that restricted its descent to a particular class of persons
and not to all heirs. The other abolished primogeniture, under which, Thomas
Paine later observed, aristocratic families "exposed" most of their children.
"Aristocracy has never but one child. The rest are begotten to be devoured." 9
In tandem, Jefferson's proposals, which the legislature adopted, aimed to throw
off feudal burdens, revive the ancient common law, and hence recover the
notion of freehold, which alone could sustain free government. They also
would redistribute land more equitably, so that families could support
themselves as households.92
It was important that these households be engaged in a particular type of
enterprise: agriculture. "Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens.
They are the most vigorous, the most independent, the most virtuous, & they
are tied to their country & wedded to it's liberty & interests by the most lasting
87 id. at 118-19.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 106. The phrase "at the expence of" connotes something like "through the energy of," not, as
modem usage would imply, "to the disadvantage of."
90 Id. at 119.
91 THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, Part One, in THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED WRrrITNGs 433, 478 (Eric
Foner ed., 1995).
92 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 84, at 32-33,
38-39, 44.
In the earlier times of the colony when lands were to be obtained for little or nothing, some
provident individuals procured large grants, and, desirous of founding great families for
themselves, settled them on their descendants in fee-tail. The transmission of this property from
generation to generation in the same name raised up a distinct set of families who, being privileged
by law in the perpetuation of their wealth were thus formed into a Patrician order, distinguished by
the splendor and luxury of their establishments .... To annul this privilege, and ... to make an
opening for the aristocracy of virtue and talent.., was deemed essential to a well ordered republic.
Id. at 32. See also I DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 247-60 (1948).
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bonds., 93  Because of the domestic benefits that farmers bestowed, because
fishing the oceans risked international conflict and war, and because commerce
in general entailed similar risks, Jefferson advocated converting the energy of
as many citizens as possible to farming.94 Thus, in reflecting on the proposed
Constitution, Jefferson approved, but conditionally:
After all, it is my principle that the will of the majority should always
prevail. If they approve the proposed Convention, in all it's parts, I
shall concur in it cheerfully, in hopes that they will amend it
whenever they shall find it work wrong. I think our governments
will remain virtuous for many centuries; as long as they are chiefly
agricultural; and this will be as long as there shall be vacant lands in
any part of America. When they get piled upon one another in large
cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe. 95
Given these commitments, Jefferson's quarrel with Alexander Hamilton's
fiscal proposals during Washington's administration was unsurprising.
Jefferson did not despair, however, for he hoped that the people would
repudiate Hamilton's "corrupt" policy. 96 When, a decade later, Jefferson's
people elected him President, he repeated his commitment to the primacy of
agriculture. Among "the essential principles of our Government," he said in
his First Inaugural, was "encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its
handmaid.,
97
93 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug. 23, 1785), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra
note 84, at 818. He recapitulated this position in Query XXII of his Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS
JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 84, at 301.
94 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Jay (Aug. 23, 1785), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra
note 84, at 818-19. See also Notes on the State of Virginia, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 84,
at 300-01:
Young as we are, and with such a country before us to fill with people and with happiness, we
should point in that direction the whole generative force of nature, wasting none of it in efforts of
mutual destruction .... And, perhaps, to remove as much as possible the occasions of making
war, it might be better for us to abandon the ocean altogether, that being the element whereon we
shall be principally exposed to jostle with other nations: to leave to others to bring what we shall
want, and to carry what we can spare.
95 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS,
supra note 84, at 918.
96 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Mason (Feb. 4, 1791), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS,
supra note 84, at 972. Jefferson wrote: "The only corrective of what is corrupt in our present form of
government will be the augmentation of the numbers in the lower house, so as to get a more agricultural
representation, which may put that interest above that of the stock-jobbers."
97 Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra
note 84, at 494-95.
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The upshot of Jefferson's philosophy, for purposes of political operation,
was distinctly democratic. The upshot, for purposes of political structure, was
decentralist. And the upshot, for purposes of principle, was libertarian.
Within the world of republican thought, Alexander Hamilton opposed
Jefferson at almost every turn. To begin, Hamilton's deepest instincts were
anti-Aristotelian. He rejected the need for or presumption of an organic unity
between society and state. His assumption and aim, with respect to the
emerging political order after the Revolution, were that a constitutional
machine could (and must) rework society in its own image. Thus, although he
shared Locke's individualist intuitions in matters of economy and his
attachment to material prosperity as a fundamental value, Hamilton did not
embrace Locke's felicitous conception of the social and natural orders
antecedent to the creation of government. Hamilton's image of stateless
society was Hobbesian, in which chaos reigned. The purpose of government,
then, was to cure those defects and to force people to behave, even against
their baser native inclinations.99
The problem with relations among the states under the Articles of
Confederation, he said, was that they were in utter disarray, each state going its
own way, for its own purposes, with little regard for the rest. The dangers here
were akin to the Hobbesian dangers that plagued societies without any
government at all. '°° But how to correct this condition? Hamilton's answer
was twofold.
First, because he distrusted republican governments dependent on the
virtue of their citizens (further, he discredited popular government""),
Hamilton espoused a vigorous national government possessing power
98 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to P.S. Dupont de Nemours (Apr. 24, 1816), John Jay (Aug.
23, 1785), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS, supra note 84, at 1384. "[E]xperience has proved it safer, for
the mass of individuals composing the society, to reserve to themselves personally the exercise of all rightful
powers to which they are competent .... I believe with you that morality, compassion, generosity, are innate
elements of the human constitution." Id. at 1385, 1386-87. For a brief and old but still useful overview of
Jefferson's agrarianism, see VERNON L. PARRINGTON, THE ROMANTIC REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, 1800-1860,
at 9-19 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1954) (1927).
99 Prescott, supra note 82, at xvii-xxvi, xxxix.
100 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Continentalist No. 1, in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON
649, 649-52 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Continentalist No. IV, in 2 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra, at 669-74; Alexander Hamilton, Letter to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON supra, at 400-18.
101 See, e.g., Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Jay (Apr. 26, 1775), in I THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 100, at 176-78 (worrying about the "anarchy" that follows when "the
minds of Can unthinking populace] are loosened from their attachment to ancient establishments").
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sufficient to unify, stabilize, and strengthen the nation and to override the
discordant "passions... of avarice, ambition, interest." What, though, of the
states? Frankly, he suggested, "if they were extinguished .... great economy
might be obtained by substituting a general Govt." States, he said, "are not
necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture,"
though he conceded that "subordinate authorities" would be required for
efficient administration. Regardless of the role of states in the day-to-day
administration of government, "[t]wo Sovereignties can not co-exist within the
same limits." Ultimate authority must reside in the nation. In this regard, the
British model of government "was the best in the world .... [I]t is the only
Govt in the world 'which unites public strength with individual security."' For
these and other reasons, the national will should supercede the local.0 2
Second, the general government must attend to the nation's economic
health. It should do so in two ways. One was to solidify the fiscal condition of
nation by securing and centralizing national credit and by tying the interests of
public creditors and banks to the national government.' 3 The other was to
encourage domestic manufacture, especially among "infant industries."
Doing so, he said, would encourage development of the nation's resources,
promote economic and political independence, and provide protection in time
of war."i4 Although he advocated "leav[ing] industry to itself,"'0 5 the system
that Hamilton imagined was not a scheme of laissez faire. In this respect,
therefore, his thinking deviated from both the Physiocratic ideas that informed
Jefferson's agrarianism and the new libertarian economics of Adam Smith.
What Hamilton required, again, was an active, paternalist central government,
capable of directing material development and enforcing disciplined obedience
by citizens.'i 6 What he required, in short, was a Leviathan.
102 See Hamilton's remarks in the Constitutional Convention, as recorded in JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 129-39 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1987). Madison's Notes
present many difficulties, not least that they are incomplete and that Madison himself was skeptical of their
public utility. Many scholars, moreover, have doubted the propriety of using them to discern the meaning of
the Constitution. For the limited purpose of fleshing out Hamilton's ideas of political economy, however, they
are apt enough.
103 Alexander Hamilton, Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit, in 6 THE PAPERS
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 100, at 51, 51-168. See also the letters and papers on the national bank
that are collected in 3 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 319-495 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1936).
104 Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, in 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 100, at 230, 230-340.
105 Id. at 232.
106 Prescott, supra note 82, at xxxii-xxxiii.
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As for the role of family in the mechanical beast the Constitution created,
Hamilton was conflicted, at least on the surface. At one point, he seemed to
embrace the Aristotelian notion that ties of kinship and affection would play an
important role in limiting the power of the nation:
It is a known fact in human nature that its affections are commonly
weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object.
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family
than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community
at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias
towards their local governments than towards the government of the
Union .... "'
There is reason to believe, however, that this was primarily a rhetorical move,
aiming to defuse antifederalist opposition to a strong central government;
instead, Hamilton's political commitments lay with the nation, disencumbered
from parochial interests. His economic commitment resided with commerce
and capital. Although his conception of commerce was not anti-agrarian, °8 his
political economy was unfettered from traditional (including familial) ties and
hence contained none of the romantic localism of Jefferson's republicanism.
In fact, one aim of the complex configuration of institutions in the new order,
on his account, was to inhibit familial influence over the operation and output
of government.'O° The bottom line, for Hamilton, was that the nation's
government should not concern itself with family, except to counter its
potentially dangerous tendencies.
B. Political-Economic Cleavages and the Frontier
1. Homesteaders and Speculators
If Jefferson and Hamilton embodied distinct strands of American ethos, the
strands were entwined in the fabric of the politics and policy of the new nation.
One area in which the strands were both visible and fraying involved the
acquisition and settlement of new territory.
107 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
2001).
108 See, for example, his qualified embrace of agriculture in Hamilton, Report on the Subject of
Manufactures, supra note 104, at 231, 235 (citing an argument extolling agriculture as an instrument for
occupying "uninhabited and unimproved" territory and for securing "advantageous . . . employment for
capital and labour").
109 For a brief discussion of this notion, see Brandon, supra note 5, at 1222-24.
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From the inception of American constitutional order, national policy aimed
at extending political dominion across the southern half of North America.
There were at least two problems in this regard. The first was that portions of
the continent were already occupied by native tribes. One strategy for solving
the "Indian problem" was to negotiate with the tribes for land and peace. This
strategy, however, was inefficient, so the nation adopted a two-step solution:
(1) if the tribes would not move voluntarily from desirable land, then the
United States would conquer them militarily; (2) after conquest, the nation
would remove the tribes to reserved territory, integrate their members into
civilized society, or exterminate them. 0
The second problem was to extend political dominion into the vacated land.
Competition between agrarian republicanism and liberal capitalism was an
impediment to formulating an effective national policy of settlement. In fact,
much rhetoric during the first half of the nineteenth century-especially among
agrarians-implied that the central cleavage in disputes over the national
policy of settlement was between the settler-farmer and his family, on the one
hand, and the capitalist-speculator, on the other. There is much to this
picture."' But matters were more complex than appeared on the face of the
image.
Disputes over territorial settlement antedated the Constitution. Even before
the Revolution, one of the substantial conflicts between Crown and colonists
involved British resistance to settlement on the western frontier after the defeat
of French and Indian forces in 1763.' 12 During the Revolution, the Continental
Congress adopted a resolution calling on the various states to cede their
110 It is not my aim here to defend these claims in detail. For discussions of national policy toward the
native tribes, see WILLIAM T. HAGAN, AMERICAN INDIANS 39-131 (3d ed. 1993); William T. Hagan, The
Indian in American History, 3d ed. revised, AHA Pamphlets, No. 240 (American Historical Association, 1985),
at 6-9, 10-14; Walter L. Williams, American Imperialism and the Indians, in INDIANS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
231-49 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 1988); see also generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE:
AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1970); IRVIN M. PEITHMANN, BROKEN PEACE PIPES: A FOUR-
HUNDRED-YEAR HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1964).
... See, e.g., PAUL W. GATES, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS ON THE PRAIRIE FRONTIER (1973); PARRINGTON,
supra note 98; GEORGE M. STEPHENSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS: FROM 1840 TO 1862
(Russell & Russell, 1967) (1917).




western lands to the national government. "' Virginia complied soon after the
Peace of Paris was signed. 14
One of the first pieces of business in the post-Revolution Congress was to
plan for territory "ceded by individual states" or "purchased of the Indian
inhabitants." Jefferson introduced a proposal to do just that. As revised and
adopted by a special committee in Congress, the plan's primary aim was to
install settlers in the territories. The method proposed for pursuing this aim
would in turn promote three purposes, one strategic, one political, and one
fiscal. First, the physical presence of settlers would help to secure the land.
Settlers not only would stake their claims to individual ownership, but would
serve as surrogates for the nation's claim to sovereignty over the territory.
Second, settlers would comprise the basic ingredient for "establishing a
temporary government," including townships, counties, and a legislature.
Once the population in each territory was large enough, these institutions in
turn would provide the means for establishing "permanent governments" that
were "republican" in character and for integrating the territories into the
existing constitutional order. Third, because the method for installing settlers
would be for Congress to sell parcels of land, the plan would shore up the
national treasury." 5
The resolutions did not commit to a particular model of political economy.
Perhaps, given the character of the existing economy and because Jefferson
had authored the proposal that was the impetus for the resolutions, he (and
others) assumed the agrarian-republican model would hold. Events would
complicate matters.
The Land Ordinance of 1785, for example, provided for surveys and sales
of western lands.' 6  In the precision of the directions for surveying the
territories, one can see the hand of Jefferson. And a particular provision
underscored the Jeffersonian ambition to supply the means by which settlers
might establish communities in which to raise families: One lot in each
township was reserved for maintaining public schools. But other provisions,
113 Resolution of Continental Congress on Public Lands (Oct. 10, 1780), in 18 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 915 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
114 Virginia Act of Cession (Dec. 20, 1783), in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 955-56 (F.N.
Thorpe ed., 1909).
115 Report of Government for the Western Territory (Apr. 23, 1784), in 26 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 275 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928).
116 Land Ordinance of May 20, 1785, in 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at
375-406 (J.C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).
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concerning the sales themselves, suggested an alternative orientation, more
congenial to Hamilton's favored classes. At $1.00 per acre, the minimum price
seemed accessible enough even to persons and families of meager means.
Congress, however, set an entire section of land, or 640 acres, as the minimum
size for purchase. The effect was to promote sales not to individual or familial
settlers, but to speculators who had the cash or credit to buy such sizable lots."
7
"Encouragement" from speculators, in fact, was an impetus for enactment
of the Northwest Ordinance." 8 Though it, too, followed Jefferson's model for
surveying and organization (including his proposal, which Congress had
rejected in the Ordinance of 1785, to prohibit slavery in the territory),
speculators typically were the conduit through which lands were distributed.
The Land Act of 1796 raised the minimum price to $2.00 per acre. While this
policy was not overtly pro-speculator, it did intensify speculators' relative
advantage as compared with prospective settlers; even more, the Act suggested
that raising revenue was superior to both settlers and speculators in the
Congress's hierarchy of interests." 9
None of this is to imply that settlers as a group were repositories of virtue
(Aristotelian or otherwise). The Ordinance of 1785 and subsequent acts
disposing of lands prohibited settlement in territories until after the lands had
been surveyed.2° Among the reasons for this restriction were to ensure the
orderly transfer of title to land and to encourage the establishment of
communities. Greed and the absence of meaningful governmental authority,
however, undermined these purposes, as squatting was a significant problem
from the beginning. It only grew worse over the course of the nineteenth
century. In an early effort to deal with the problem, Congress adopted the
Anti-Trespassing Act of 1807, punishing squatting on the public domain with
fine and imprisonment. 2
This Act reinforced a sentiment among potential settlers and even among
those already established that Congress was concerned more with protecting
117 GATES, supra note 111, at 141.
118 Act of the Congress of the Confederation for the Government of the Territory of the United States,
North-West of the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), in 2 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 114, at
957-62. The Ordinance was reenacted after the Constitution was ratified. An Act to Provide for the
Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50-53 (1789).
119 See THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 877 (Eric Foner & John A. Garraty eds.,
1991).
120 This policy ended with the Pre-Emption Act of 1841. See HILDEGARD BINDER JOHNSON, ORDER UPON
THE LAND: THE U.S. RECTANGULAR LAND SURVEY AND THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI 64 (1976).
121 DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 126-27 (1984).
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revenue and speculators than with promoting settlement and the welfare of
settlers. In fact, however, Congress was increasingly responsive to pressure
from settlers throughout the nineteenth century. The Land Act of 1800 had
aimed to attract settlers by reducing the minimum size for sale to 320 acres and
by providing for sales on credit over a period of four years, with a down
payment of only $160.00.12' The Land Act of 1820 liberalized the
requirements even further, lowering the minimum size to eighty acres and the
minimum price to $1.25 per acre.' Although this Act rescinded provisions of
the Act of 1800 concerning sales on credit, the Relief Act of 1820 aimed to
give purchasers relief from debt. Specifically, the Relief Act permitted anyone
who had made the first payment on four quarter-sections (640 acres) to retain
title to one of the quarters by relinquishing the other three to the United States.
Alternatively, if such a debtor wanted to try to hold onto all four quarter-
sections, the Relief Act extended credit for up to ten years.14
Beginning in the 1830s, moreover, Congress began flirting with a policy
that was a logical corollary to the Jeffersonian ambition to make land easily
available to settlers. 25  At the same time, however, the policy effectively
subverted the sort of ordered settlement that, on the Jeffersonian ideal, would
have facilitated the development of republican communities in which families
could flourish. The policy was preemption. Its purpose was to ratify squatters'
premature seizures of public land. Its effect was essentially to quiet title to
such land, permitting squatters to sell their homesteads to a new wave of
settlers.126 Congress's first formal foray into preemption came in 1830. The
17Act was tentative in that it operated prospectively and expired after one year.12
Congress wrestled with extensions to this temporary Act, 2 but a more
enduring commitment to preemption was not long in the wing.
Reflecting on the Whigs' victory in the national election of 1840, George
M. Stephenson claims that it was fundamentally a response to "a great change
in sentiment relative to the public domain." More strongly, he suggests, the
election marked the victory of preemption as national policy." 9 Even if these
122 Land Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 55, 2 Stat. 73.
123 Land Act of Apr. 24, 1820, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 566.
124 FELLER, supra note 121, at 35.
125 On the Jeffersonian origins of the policy of cheap land, see GATES, supra note 111, at 140.
126 TURNER, supra note 18, at 20.
127 STEPHENSON, supra note 111, at 25.
128 Id. at 40-42.
129 Id. at 43.
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claims exaggerate our capacity to interpret elections,3 they are defensible
enough. The election produced a Congress that quickly enacted, with
President John Tyler's blessing, the Pre-Emption Act of 1841.' The Act
aspired comprehensively to resolve conflicts over both settlement and revenue.
With respect to settlement, the Act permitted squatters-heads of families,
widows, and single men over the age of twenty-one-to settle on a quarter-
section (160 acres) of land, with the right to purchase at the minimum price
once the land was put up for sale. With respect to revenue, proceeds from
sales were to be distributed in this way: ten percent of revenues to states in
which the land sat, remainder to the rest of the states, except in time of war or
if tariffs were levied above twenty percent on any given import. 32
With these political developments in mind, Daniel Feller argues that "the
dichotomous images of settler and speculator were essentially fallacious."'
For one thing, says Feller, the moral qualities depicted in the stereotypes-
settler as virtuous and productive, speculator as vicious and idle-were not
simply exaggerated but wrong. The speculator was not an idler, extracting
wealth from others' productivity, but "a doer, a booster," who promoted
growth in the West through "cities, farms, roads, [and] canals." For another,
and more importantly, "[t]he interests of settler and speculator actually joined
at many points." Often, the speculator was not an Eastern (nor a foreign)
capitalist, but a Westerner, like the settler. Both settler and speculator had an
interest in cheap land, with rising prices spurred by growth and development.
And the conventional distinction- "that the settler wanted to work the land,
while the speculator acquired it only as a commodity to be held for profit"-is
erroneous. Farmers, says Feller, "habitually claimed more land than they
could farm." In fact, "the purchase of land for resale was commonplace
throughout the West." 14 It is also true that farmers frequently were not the
civic-minded husbands of the soil depicted in romantic republican rhetoric, but
enterprisers, many of whom worked the soil until they depleted it and then
moved on, abandoning both communities and large expanses of exhausted
land.'35
130 Compare, for example, STANLEY KELLEY, JR., INTERPRETING ELECTIONS (1983).
131 STEPHENSON, supra note 111, at 45-62. Tyler had been elected Vice President in 1840. He ascended
to the office of President when William Henry Harrison ("Old Tippecanoe") died one month after taking
office.
132 Pre-Emption Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453 (repealed 1891).
133 FELLER, supra note 121, at 29-30.
134 Id. at 29-31, 196.
13 Id. at 81.
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There is value in correcting the demonic image of the speculator. Even so,
and notwithstanding the suspicious way in which Feller's rehabilitation
transforms speculators from rapacious demons to model citizens, it requires a
stretch to attribute to them the same interests and capacities as farmers. For
speculators tended to have resources and access to credit that most farmers
could but dimly imagine."' Thus, most speculators could easily purchase land
out from under squatters, even after the rise of preemption as national policy.
37
Moreover, because the early land acts lacked ceilings on the amount of land
one could purchase, speculators frequently could reconnoiter a vast domain
and buy the most desirable land. In some places, like the Yazoo Tract in what
is now Mississippi, they could comer the market, if not through legitimate
purchase, then through bribery."' Frequently, then, potential settlers had to go
through speculators to acquire land. These conditions not only put speculators
generally at a competitive advantage, but permitted some to operate as
predators.
Andrew Jackson's Specie Circular did address some of these excesses.
Specifically, it aimed "to repress alleged frauds, and to withhold any
countenance or facilities in the power of the Government from the monopoly
of the public lands in the hands of speculators and capitalists, to the injury of
the actual settlers in the new States." The circular required (1) that payment
for public land be made only in gold, silver, or, with respect to certain lands,
Virginia land scrip; and (2) that other, less solid modes of payment would
continue to be accepted from any "purchaser who is an actual settler or bona
fide resident in the State where the sales are made," but only on plots of fewer
than 320 acres. 39 The circular did in fact suppress the sale of lands, but its
effect in this regard was temporary. Its longer-term effect was to concentrate
financial control over sales to Eastern banks, whose terms were frequently
usurious. And, as an indication of how powerful Hamiltonianism was
becoming as a description of the logic of American political economy, the
collapse in sales contributed to an economic panic in 1837, forcing many who
were deeply invested in land to liquidate and hence lose it.
14
136 See GATES, supra note 111, at 6-22.
137 FELLER acknowledges this, supra note 121, at 31.
138 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). For a narrative recounting of Fletcher, see C.
PETER MCGRATH, YAZoo: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1966).
139 Circular from the Treasury, No. 1548 (July 11, 1836), in 8 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS
910 (1861). See also Andrew Jackson, Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1836), in 3 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 249 (James D. Richardson ed., 1903).
140 See GATES, supra note Il l, at 14-15.
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2. Sectionalism and Slavery
Regardless of the persistent plausibility of less-than-flattering images of
speculators, however, Feller is correct that political divisions over national
policy toward settlement cannot be explained entirely by competition between
settlers and speculators. One powerful alternative explanation is
sectionalism-specifically, the overlapping and divergent interests and values
of North, South, and West.14' Sectionalism at bottom was a generic surrogate
for considerations of political economy, public morality, and ways of life.
Although tensions between farmers and speculators were present in all three
considerations, sectionalism was never reducible to them, nor to any simple
explanation from class-based antagonism. Nonetheless, policy over westward
settlement was one arena in which regional differences sometimes became
open hostilities. This was so at least as early as the crisis over the tariffs of
1828 and 1832.142 As the elaborate provisions of the Pre-Emption Act of 1841
demonstrated, moreover, Jackson's nationalist resolution of the crisis did not
unify regional preferences.'
43
After 1841, sectionalism became increasingly visibly connected with the
status of slavery in the nation and under the Constitution. But debates over
slavery were rarely isolated from debates over the Western territories and
hence did not remain battles simply between North and South. Divergent
conceptions of the agrarian family were always just beneath the surface, for the
conflict pitted two types of agrarian family against each other: the Southern
slaveholding household and the Northern white nuclear family.'" The
subterranean presence of family as a political issue was nowhere stronger than
in the new states of the Old Northwest. And, as it happened, issues of the
status and stakes of the territories were nowhere joined more publicly or
systematically than between two politicians of the Old Northwest: Stephen A.
Douglas and Abraham Lincoln. 14 The opportunity for their debates was a race
141 This theme is an important element of the accounts of Frederick Jackson Turner and his intellectual
heirs. See STEPHENSON, supra note 11; TURNER, supra note 18; RAYNOR G. WELLINGTON, THE POLITICAL
AND SECTIONAL INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLIC LANDS 1828-1842 (1914).
142 See WELLINGTON, supra note 141, at 12-48.
143 For accounts of the roles of regional division and national policy toward public lands in the election of
1840 and the Pre-Emption Act, see STEPHENSON, supra note 111, at 19-37; WELLINGTON, supra note 141, at
75-113.
144 For a discussion of some of the ways in which conflicts over slavery were implicated in policies of
territorial expansion, see BRANDON, supra note 32, at 66-74.
145 For one edition of the debates between Lincoln and Douglas, see 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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for one of Illinois's seats in the U.S. Senate. The impetus for and persistent
theme of the debates, however, was the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford."'
Apologists for slavery frequently displayed a penchant for the classical,
especially the Aristotelian. John C. Calhoun was probably the most prominent
exemplar of this inclination, but he was not the only one. 47 Proslavery ethos
was heavily influenced by Aristotle, not least in its conception of the family.
As we have already seen, Aristotle posited that the familial household, not the
individual, was the basic unit of political economy. The members of that unit
included everyone who made it economically (and biologically) viable: a man,
one or more women, children, and slaves. 14 Slaveholders employed this same
conception. 49 Their doing so permitted them to ignore the ways in which the
slaveholding household subverted slaves' capacity to maintain their own
familial ties."O Thus, it was no accident that the slaveholders' ethos was
characterized as "paternalism." Although it is tempting to dismiss their doing
so as pretextual or merely rhetorical, there is evidence-from judicial
decisions, statutes, and cultural sources-that these invocations of family were
not merely shams, no matter how perverse they appear to us today. The
familial trope performed real work in constructing and maintaining
slaveholders' (and others') worldviews. ' A prominent proslavery critique of
capitalism was that it undermined the organic unity of society by, among other
things, destroying ties of familial affection and interest. Free labor in a
capitalist order, according to this critique, was oxymoronic, for capital
devoured its laborers as free individuals. 12
Slavery would have been controversial had its proponents not wished to
expand its domain. Some proslavers, however, did wish to do so."' Given a
wide range of political, economic, climatic, and cultural realities, such
ambitions were largely quixotic, especially by the middle of the nineteenth
146 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
147 John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN (Richard K.
Cralle ed., 1883).
148 See supra Part ll.B.
149 The Supreme Court ratified it as well. See United States v. Boisdore, 52 U.S. 63, 94 (1850) (adopting
the Aristotelian view of slaves as members of the slaveholder's family).
150 See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997).
151 See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974).
152 See GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, OR THE FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY (1854).
153 See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE SLAVEHOLDERS' DILEMMA: FREEDOM AND PROGRESS IN
SOUTHERN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT, 1820-1860 (1992).
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century. But with one stroke in Dred Scott, the Supreme Court made these
ambitions seem not only possible but irresistible-at least on one reading of
the Court's opinion. That was precisely the reading that Abraham Lincoln
gave it.
The image by which he is now best known appeared in a speech in
Springfield before his formal debates with Douglas began:
"A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this
government cannot endure, permanently half slave and half free. I do
not expect the Union to be dissolved-I do not expect the house to
fall-but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all
one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery, will
arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall
rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its
advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all
the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.
154
Although this move suggested a distinct policy toward territorial settlement,
Lincoln's commitments were complex and conflicted throughout the debates.
At bottom, however, his position seems to have been this: The territories
should be open to settlement by free labor, to the exclusion of slave labor; on
petition for admission to the Union, the citizens of each prospective new state
could decide whether slavery would be permitted.'s-
Underlying this position were two sentiments: a belief that free labor was
the wave of the future and an aversion to opening the territories to settlement
by blacks, slave or free. Lincoln united these sentiments in a depiction of the
republican family. The territories, he insisted, should be reserved for "free
white laborers, who want the land to bring up their families upon." He
affirmed the proposition that Douglas had pressed in an earlier speech, "that
this government was made for white men." "[N]o one," said Lincoln, "wants
to deny it." Thus, free families in the territories should be racially pure: "[A]s
154 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 16, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 461-62.
155 Se the following speeches by Abraham Lincoln: Speech at Springfield, Illinois (July 17, 1858), in 3
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 507-08; First Debate at Ottawa, Illinois
(Aug. 21, 1858); in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 18-19; Second
Debate at Freeport, Illinois (Aug. 27, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note
145, at 40-42; Third Debate at Quincy, Illinois (Oct 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 116; Sixth Debate at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 127; Seventh Debate at Alton, Illinois (Oct. 15, 1858) in 3
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 311-12.
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God made us separate, we can leave one another alone, and do one another
much good thereby. There are white men enough to marry all the white
women, and enough black men to marry all the black women, and in God's
name let them be so married." This policy, he said, would preclude the racial
"amalgamation" that Douglas feared. "Why, Judge [Douglas], if we do not
let [the races] get together in the Territories; they won't mix there." 56 With
characteristic liberality, however, Lincoln extended Jefferson's Saxon liberty
to persons of "German, Irish, French, and Scandinavian" ancestry.1
5 7
3. Cross-Cutting Cleavages and National Expansion
Lincoln, of course, did not manufacture slavery and sectional division as
political issues. He merely exploited them. The sources of sectionalism in
which slavery was implicated were many and longstanding. One source,
which altered fundamentally the terms on which sectional battles were fought,
was the Mexican War. Although the Mexican cession perfected the nation's
continental aspirations, it also provided extensive new turf for politicians and
others to fight over. 5' These battles were not always explicitly over slavery's
expansion, but slavery was lurking persistently in the background.
One famous battle involved the construction of a transcontinental railroad.
The most visible conflicts involved the railroad's location: Would the
Congress endorse (and finance) a northern or a southern route? Thanks largely
to the acumen of Stephen A. Douglas, the northern route prevailed, but not
without piquing sectional jealousy. 9 Less visible than the fight over the
railroad's route was resentment over the fact that Congress chose to subsidize
construction through grants of land to the railroad corporations. The
Hamiltonian logic behind these grants was that government would fulfill its
obligation to underwrite prosperity, but would also protect the treasury by
ensuring that settlers who followed the railroads would pay a higher price
($2.50/acre, compared with $1.25) for public land. Even among Westerners
who coveted internal improvements, this logic seemed perversely to tax
agriculture for the benefit of corporations. A better policy, some reasoned,
156 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Chicago (July 10, 1858), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 498.
157 Id. at 499.
158 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (signed Feb. 2, 1848, ratified May 30, 1848), in 1 TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 1107 (William M. Malloy et al. eds., 1910).
159 For a brief discussion, see BRANDON, supra note 32, at 80-81.
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would be to open the land to homesteading (at the lower price) and permit the
corporations-which had the means and incentive to pay their own way-to
follow the settlers. 1r
Another battle, also pitting homesteaders against monied interests, grew out
of the Mexican War. Congress became decidedly generous in offering land as
a bounty to soldiers who had served in the War. On its face, this policy would
not have seemed especially controversial, but many settlers opposed it.
Fueling their opposition was the fact that soldiers frequently neither wanted
nor were able to resettle in the West, and so sold their bounty to speculators,
who were able to purchase extensive tracts for a pittance.
6'
A similar antagonism grew out of the Graduation Act of 1854. The policy
of graduation was straightforward: Land that had gone unsold for more than
thirty years would be offered for sale at 12.5 cents/acre. 62 The policy was
attractive to the national government mainly for fiscal reasons. Selling these
"problem" lands would generate a small amount of revenue, but, more
importantly, would permit the government to shut down land offices, which
were expensive to maintain even when relatively inactive. The states of the
Old Northwest tended to favor the policy, because it meant that empty land,
when sold, would finally be taxable. Many Northeasterners, however, opposed
the policy. Their argument, pressed forcefully by Horace Greely, was that
bargain-basement prices would reward "thriftlessness and improvidence" and
would send westward persons who were ill-fit to suffer the rigors of pioneering
life, much less to flourish in it."' The material motivation for this position was
an endemic Eastern antagonism to any policy that might soften the supply of
labor. Western homesteaders opposed graduation because they said it
rewarded laggards (sometimes with very desirable parcels), while effectively
penalizing the industry and perseverance of the first families of pioneers, who
had endured hardship and uncertainty. Graduation, they argued, might lower
the price of all land and not merely that of the parcels for sale. Southerners
tended to support the policy, perhaps at bottom because Easterners opposed it.
With Southern support, the policy prevaed.'
160 See STEPHENSON, supra note 111, at 122-24.
161 Id. at 118-22.
162 id. at 186-88.
163 Id. at 129.
'64 Id. at 126-30.
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century. But with one stroke in Dred Scott, the Supreme Court made these
ambitions seem not only possible but irresistible-at least on one reading of
the Court's opinion. That was precisely the reading that Abraham Lincoln
gave it.
The image by which he is now best known appeared in a speech in
Springfield before his formal debates with Douglas began:
"A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this
government cannot endure, permanently half slave and halffree. I do
not expect the Union to be dissolved-I do not expect the house to
fall-but T do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all
one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery, will
arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall
rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its
advocates will push it forward, till it shall become alike lawful in all
the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.'54
Although this move suggested a distinct policy toward territorial settlement,
Lincoln's commitments were complex and conflicted throughout the debates.
At bottom, however, his position seems to have been this: The territories
should be open to settlement by free labor, to the exclusion of slave labor; on
petition for admission to the Union, the citizens of each prospective new state
could decide whether slavery would be permitted. 5
Underlying this position were two sentiments: a belief that free labor was
the wave of the future and an aversion to opening the territories to settlement
by blacks, slave or free. Lincoln united these sentiments in a depiction of the
republican family. The territories, he insisted, should be reserved for "free
white laborers, who want the land to bring up their families upon." He
affirmed the proposition that Douglas had pressed in an earlier speech, "that
this government was made for white men." "[N]o one," said Lincoln, "wants
to deny it." Thus, free families in the territories should be racially pure: "[A]s
154 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 16, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 461-62.
155 See the following speeches by Abraham Lincoln: Speech at Springfield, Illinois (July 17, 1858), in 3
THE C-LLECTFD WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 507-08, First Debate at Ottawa, Illinois
(Aug. 21, 1858); in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 18-19; Second
Debate at Freeport, Illinois (Aug. 27, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECrED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note
145, at 40-42; Third Debate at Quincy, Illinois (Oct 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 116; Sixth Debate at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 127; Seventh Debate at Alton, Illinois (Oct. 15, 1858) in 3
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 145, at 311-12.
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maximum price of $1.25/acre or, if a family had settled the entire parcel
continuously for five years, for free.' 69 Agrarian romantics at the time might
have dreamed that this policy signified an unambiguous victory for
Jeffersonian republicanism as against Hamilton's political economy. As if to
squelch such sentiment Congress passed the Pacific Railway Act two months
later. "0
4. Agrarian Discontent
Thus, the ambivalent national embrace of homesteading families and
speculators persisted into the last half of the century. Some observers have
argued, however, that the Hamiltonian strand of American ethos was actually
victorious in the end. For one thing, the Homestead Act did not succeed
unequivocally on Jeffersonian terms. George W. Julian, a devoted Republican
of the day, offered three reasons for this failure. First, the Act lacked adequate
safeguards against speculation. This meant that speculators could often gain
through the back door what they could not through the front. Second, under a
new policy concerning the disposition of lands formerly held by various tribes,
these lands were not conveyed to the United States but were released directly
to monopolists, railroad corporations, and speculators. Viewed through an
agrarian lens, this policy engendered corrupt ties between capital and the
national government. Third, the land grants to railroads placed in corporate
hands massive amounts of land, which, again through an agrarian lens, should
have gone to settlers. " '
With respect to the last point, Hildegard Johnson points out that "fewer
acres were passed on to settlers under the Homestead Act than were sold by the
railroads for four dollars an acre."' 7 2 Similar patterns appeared in Texas and
the lands of the Mexican Cession, where large-scale ranching overwhelmed
smaller-scale familial farms. 173 In parts of the Far West, national policy
ensured that vast amounts of land and resources found their way to
169 id.
170 Pacific Railway Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 489.
171 GEORGE WASHINGTON JULIAN, POLITICAL RECOLLECTIONS, 1840-1872, at 216-18 (1884).
172 JOHNSON, supra note 120, at 66 (citing H.N. SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST As SYMBOL
AND MYTH 190 (1950), and J.F. HART, The Middle West, 62 ANNALS OFTHE ASs'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 258
(1972)).
173 See LEWIS ATHERTON, THE CATTLE KINGS (1961); DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN
THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 (1987).
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corporations and speculators.14  In 1875, Congress resumed the policy of
accepting payment for land by specie."'
These considerations aside, however, the Homestead Act intensified a trend
that the earlier preemption acts had provoked: the diffusion of agricultural
settlement. 1 6 Although diffusion promoted the national ambition to secure
sovereign claims to territory, it undermined agrarian-republican goals of
assuring settlement through families in nuclear communities and therefore of
extending a polity knit together through webs of communitarian attachment.
7
An agrarian republican might have predicted that diffuse settlement would
generate diffuse political attachments, which in turn would undermine the
capacity of people to sustain any sort of political life. For reasons that
Tocqueville implied and Hamilton understood, however, this aspect of the
organic account of the character of politics would not hold in the American
case, for it could not anticipate the presence or function of the nation-state.
Weak local attachments might not lead to the dissolution of politics if there
were a nation-state sufficiently powerful to sustain political forms in the
absence of such attachments. Although correlation does not establish
causation, there was such a nation-state in the United States, at least where
matters of political economy were concerned.
In the preceding century, Alexander Hamilton had posited that the
development of a market-based economy required a vigorous national
government. Jeffersonians had opposed this view, in part because they feared
the consequences of a strong central state. Daniel Feller claims that the
abolition of the credit system, the policy of preemption, and the Homestead
Act were ultimately unsuccessful because the Hamiltonian logic of the political
economy-including the ethos that underwrote the commodification of land-
was too powerful to resist. 17 Perhaps the only way Jeffersonian policy could
have prevailed was through a government strong enough to make the policy
stick. That condition, of course, was incompatible with certain premises of
Jeffersonian thought.
174 See, e.g., Timber and Stone Lands Act of 1878, ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89; and the Desert Lands Act of 1877,
ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377; the Timber Culture Act of 1873, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605.
175 Specie Payments Act of Jan. 14, 1875, ch. 15, 18 Stat. 296.
176 See JOHNSON, supra note 120, at 64.
177 See id. at 38.
178 FELLER, supra note 121, at 198.
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Notwithstanding agrarian pessimism about the trajectory of national policy,
however, there is reason to think that principles of agrarian republicanism
persisted, if not in formal national policy, then in disparate settlements on the
frontier. But, as we shall see, the fruit of those settlements would be
surprising.
C. Economy, Family, and Morality
1. Family in the Supreme Court
Congress was not the only institution concerned with matters that
implicated family. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Court had
persistently affirmed the importance of the marital family in all three
substantive domains-economic, moral, and political. The Court's
jurisprudence touched on three related themes. One was the intimate doctrinal
connection between economy and family. The second was a growing
dissonance over the proper conception of family-whether it was an institution
created and regulable by law or was a prepolitical institution exempt from
some sorts of regulation. The third was the importance of the role of a
particular form of family in promoting and preserving a kind of moral order.
Many of the Court's decisions involved applications of common law or
other sources of local law. Neither the existence nor the number of these cases
is especially surprising, given the Court's function in the nineteenth century as
common-law court of last resort. The content of some of the issues the Court
addressed, however, might well be striking from our present perspective,
which tends to see the Court's primary function as engaging weighty and
abstract matters of individualist rights and collective powers. This perspective,
I think, is misguided in at least two respects: it overlooks the ways in which
many of the things most fundamental to people's lives-personal or political-
are frequently quite mundane, and it presumes a fairly bright line between
common law and constitutional law. This presumption is problematic, not only
because it overlooks the constitutive power of mundane things, but also
because it ignores the importance, especially in the nineteenth century, of
common law to the constitution of the order.
79
179 In Fletcher v. Peck, for example, Chief Justice Marshall decided the case in part through an application
of the doctrine protecting bona fide purchasers for value who had no notice of a defect in title. 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810). This was significant, not merely because it resolved doubts about settlement of the
Mississippi territory, but also because it helped knit considerations of property and contract into the
fundamental law of the nation. Id. I am grateful to John C.P. Goldberg for clarifying thoughts on the
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The roots of the Court's common-law jurisprudence of family extended to
England, of course, but the Court sometimes took pains to distinguish the
American law from that of England (or the European continent). A familiar
trope was that the English and European models were rooted in feudal or
aristocratic regimes that tended to concentrate wealth in a few families or in a
few hands within families. This way of thinking about family, the Court
reasoned, was inappropriate in the United States, where norms and institutions
were republican in character.8 0 One arena in which republican norms did not
hold, of course, was that of slavery; on this front, the Court occasionally took
up cases involving the status of families as slave or free, though it rarely
paused to consider potentially knotty questions about a difference of status
between parents and children. 8'
Unsurprisingly, most of the Court's decisions involved matters of contract
and property. The contexts varied in which these matters arose. One involved
the duty of a father to support his wife and family. 1 2  Another involved theprivilege against adverse spousal testimony.8 3 Still other cases addressed a
constitutional status of the common law. See John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1828,
1846 (1999).
180 See Bates v. Brown, 72 (5 Wall.) U.S. 710, 714-16 (1866); Croxall v. Shererd, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 268,
284-86 (1866); McDonogh's Ex'rs v. Murdoch, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 367, 408 (1853); Bosley v. Wyatt, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 390, 397-98 (1852); Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 58, 93 (1829). In two cases-one
involving a right to livelihood, the other involving the protection of families against creditors-justices cited
English common law approvingly. See Cent. Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Hume, 128 U.S. (16 Wall.) 195, 211-12
(1888); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 103-06 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
181 See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539 (1842); Menard v. Aspasia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 505 (1831).
182 See Cent. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 128 U.S. at 211 (extending the duty to support after death, to insulate
against claims of creditors the estate of a deceased father); Hoyt v. Hammekin, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 346, 350
(1852) (holding that, under civil law, property purchased for a minor daughter by her mother could not be
conveyed away by the father, even with the mother's consent); Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495,
555-56, 560 (1850) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (observing that "[i]f the father is not able to maintain his children,
the court will order maintenance out of their own estate"); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504,
507 (1847) (upholding state statute regulating the liberty of "any person [who] shall, by excessive drinking of
spirituous liquors, so misspend, waste, or lessen his estate as thereby either to expose himself or his family to
want or indigent circumstances, or the town to which he belongs to expense for the maintenance of him or his
family").
183 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 220-23 (1839).
This rule [forbidding testimony of a wife against her husband] is founded upon the deepest and
soundest principles of our nature. Principles which have grown out of those domestic relations,
that constitute the basis of civil society, and which are essential to the enjoyment of that
confidence which should subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and dearest
relations of life. To break down or impair the great principles which protect the sanctities of
husband and wife, would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.
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range of issues, including the general status or contractual capacity of
women,184 the protection of a wife from liability for innocently promulgating
fraudulent misrepresentations of her husband,'85 the insulation of property from
access by creditors, 86 the permissibility of transfers of property between
members of a family, 187 and the status of illegitimate children or heirs." 8 One
Id.
184 See Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414 (1899) (involving effect of married women's property act on
wife's capacity to dispose of property); Ankeney v. Hannon, 147 U.S. 118 (1893) (wife's contract with
creditor can not bind her separate property acquired after the contract); Marchand v. Griffon, 140 U.S. 516
(1891) (concerning wife's capacity to enter into contracts); Brodnax v. Aetna Ins. Co., 128 U.S. 236 (1888)
(concerning wife's capacity to pledge her separate property to cover husband's debt); Stringfellow v. Cain, 99
U.S. 610 (1878) (concerning widow's capacity, as head of family, to continue an adverse possession
commenced by her husband); Jackson v. Jackson, 91 U.S. 122 (1875) (raising questions in action for divorce
about title to property purchased with money wife had prior to the marriage); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1872) (upholding state's prohibition against licensing women to practice law); Silver v. Ladd, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 219, 224, 227-28 (1868) (holding that a widow with children was a "head of family" for
purposes of congressional statute concerning disposition of lands in the territories); Wallingsford v. Allen, 35
U.S. (10 Pet.) 583 (1836) (concerning wife's authority to manumit a slave transferred to her for her use by her
husband).
185 Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. (18 Wheat.) 229, 239 (1823) ("All know and feel.., the sacredness of the
connection between husband and wife. All know that the sweetness of social intercourse, the harmony of
society, the happiness of families, depend on that mutual partiality which they feel, or that delicate forbearance
which they manifest, towards each other.").
186 See Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U.S. 607 (1894) (involving intrafamilial transfers that made creditors
vulnerable); Cent. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 128 U.S. at 211 (finding payment under life insurance policy to widow
not reachable by creditors of husband: the "public policy which . . . recognizes the support of wife and
children as a positive obligation in law as well as morals, should be extended to protect them from destitution
after the debtor's death"); Huntington v. Saunders, 120 U.S. 78 (1887) (holding that conveyance from husband
to wife not reachable by creditors to satisfy husband's debt); Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272, 275-76 (1882)
(upholding the power of a state to exempt homesteads from levy and execution: "These laws are founded in a
humane regard to the women and children of families"); P.H. Allen & Co. v. Ferguson, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 1, 4
(1873) ("Neither the supreme will, so far as we can ascertain it, nor the laws of the land, require that a debtor
whose family is in need ... should prefer a creditor to his family."); Drury v. Foster, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 24
(1864) (holding a mortgage not binding on the estate of a feme covert); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 213, 283, 289-90 (1827) ("[S]ociety has an interest in preserving every member of the community
from despondency-in relieving him from a hopeless state of prostration, in which he would be useless to
himself, his family, and the community.").
187 See Garner v. Second Nat'l Bank of Providence, 151 U.S. 420, 431 (1894) ("[Hlusband and wife....
could treat each other as lender and borrower, and.., such a contract would carry with it the usual incident of
interest, the same as with other parties."); Taylor v. Taylor, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 183, 199-201 (1850) (finding
that intrafamilial transfers of property, as for example between parent and child, are subject to a fiduciary
obligation); Wallingsford, 35 U.S. at 594 ("Agreements between husband and wife, during coverture, for the
transfer from him of property directly to the latter .... [though] void at law .... [may be sustained] when a
clear and satisfactory case is made out, that the property is to be applied to the separate use of the wife.").
188 See Conley v. Nailor, 118 U.S. 127, 134 (1886) (involving a challenge to deeds executed by an elderly
man to his mistress, for whom he had abandoned his marital family: "It is not now open to question that a deed
made by a father for the benefit of his illegitimate child, is upon good consideration, which will support the
conveyance."); Gay v. Parpart, 106 U.S. 679, 686-87 (1883) (finding conveyance by father of illegitimate
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case held that marriage was sufficient consideration to support a transfer of
property,1s9 but more typical were cases that considered marriage to be a
distinctly different, noncommercial sort of contract, partaking of a kind of
status, specially governable under the civil law.' 90
Dissenting in an antebellum case, for example, Justice Daniel emphasized
the sweeping power of states to regulate familial life. "This power [of
regulation]," he said, "belongs exclusively to the particular communities of
which those families form parts, and is essential to the order and to the very
existence of such communities."' 9' At the same time, however, he could talk
about families in libertarian terms that seemed to anticipate the notion of a
private sphere for familial life, though he confined this trope to denying
regulatory authority to the national government:
It is not in accordance with the design and operation of a
Government having its origin in causes and necessities, political,
general, and external, that it should assume to regulate the domestic
relations of society; should, with a kind of inquisitorial authority,
enter the habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of
private families, and inquire into and pronounce upon the morals and
habits and affections or antipathies of the members of every
household. 192
children to the children's mother permissible as against the father's marital family: "in executing and
delivering [that assignment] to her he did a meritorious act, honorable and just, as the only atonement he could
make for the deception he practised upon her, and as placing in her hands the means of supporting the children
of whom he was the father"); Blackburn v. Crawford's Lessee, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 175 (1865) (involving
descent of intestate property to illegitimate heirs); Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. (15 Wheat.) 207
(1820) (raising the question of whether illegitimate children are entitled to property that their mother held
through the father of her legitimate children).
189 Magniac v. Thompson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 348, 393 (1833) (noting that marriage "is a consideration of
the highest value; and from motives of the soundest policy").
190 See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888) ("[Wlhilst marriage is often termed by text
writers and in decisions of courts as a civil contract-generally to indicate that it must be founded upon the
agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious ceremony for its solemnization-it is something
more than a mere contract."); Jewell's Lessee v. Jewell, 42 U.S. (I How.) 219, 233-34 (1843) (finding that
though a marriage might have been prohibited under the religious law of one of the parties, marriage is a "civil
contract," and access to it is governed by the civil law).
191 Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 602 (1858) (Daniel, J., dissenting). See also Ogden, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) at 289-90 ("[W]hy may not the community also declare that . . . 'we have an interest in the
happiness, and services, and families of this community, which shall not be superceded by individual
views?"').
192 Barber, 62 U.S. at 602.
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After the Civil War, of course, the states' control of at least one aspect of
domestic relations was abolished.' 93  The abolition of slavery and the
Fourteenth Amendment's concomitant reconfiguration of liberty and
governmental power might have suggested a couple of innovations. One,
against Justice Daniel, was an expansive new national power over domestic
relations, even beyond dismantling the relations entailed in slavery. The
Court, however, intimated that the states' pre-War authority over the marital
family persisted after the War.' 94 The second, exploiting Daniel's libertarian
trope, might have imagined family either as a repository of privilege or
immunity against certain sorts of regulation by states or as a contractual
relation whose obligations states were constitutionally prohibited from
impairing. Typically, though not consistently, the Court resisted this reading.
In Maynard v. Hill, for example, the Court held that marriage was "not...
a contract within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution which prohibits
the impairing the obligation of contracts," but was "the creation of the law
itself."' 95 This implied that the marital relation "cannot be dissolved by the
parties when consummated, nor released with or without consideration. The
relation is always regulated by government."' 96 Further,
The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to
various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for
it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress.197
If marriage were a subject for intensive scrutiny and regulation by states,
however, there was evidence by the last half of the nineteenth century that the
marital family was emerging as an institution partially autonomous from
193 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
194 Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869). In other contexts, two justices claimed
that post-War amendments to the Constitution authorized Congress to protect African-American families;
significantly, however, both suggestions appeared in dissents: United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559-
60 (1875) (Clifford, J., dissenting) (reading the Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act as
authorizing Congress to prohibit "threats of violence" against a newly enfranchised African-American citizen
or his family); Blyew v. United States 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 598-99 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (reading
the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to include a right to assist in criminal
prosecutions: "To deprive a whole class of the community of this right.., is to brand them with a badge of
slavery;... is to leave their lives, their families, and their property unprotected by law").
'9' 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
196 Id. at 213.
197 Id. at 211.
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government. Challenging the view of Maynard, the Court in Meister v. Moore
declared that although "[m]arriage is everywhere regarded as a civil contract"
whose formal prerequisites are regulated by statutes, those statutes "do not
confer the right." Marriage, the Court maintained "is a thing of common
right," and may be created through means other than those permitted by
statute.' 98
Another line of cases suggested that family might actually constrain the
exercise of governmental power. These cases concerned the ostensible right of
livelihood. Justices (not always the Court) frequently traced it to common law,
but the Fourteenth Amendment expanded opportunities for applying the
right.' 99 Some of the earliest of the Court's decisions in this vein, though not
grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, involved disbarments of attorneys.200
Most cases in which the Court linked family to livelihood, however, involved
allegations of monopoly or restraint of trade.' The point of the Justices'
reasoning in this context was that some forms of capital threatened one of the
polity's fundamental social units-the family. This logic could be converted
from a shield against government to a justification for the exercise of
102governmental power against family-threatening monopolies. It might also
justify, on one Justice's account, treating corporate and individual incomes
203differently, for purposes of a national income tax.
19' 96 U.S. 76, 78, 80-81 (1877).
199 See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 102-06 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting)
(linking the constitutional right to the common law).
200 See Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 318 (1883) (Field, J., dissenting) ("To disbar him having such a
practice ... would often entail poverty upon himself, and destitution upon his family."); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 355 (1871) ("To most persons who enter the profession, it is the means of support to
themselves and their families."); Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. 364, 376 (1868) (justifying issuing a writ of
mandamus to reinstate an attorney, for reason inter alia that he is "suddenly deprived of the only means of an
honorable support of himself and family").
201 See Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co. of Baltimore, 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889) (affirming the doctrine of
Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 64); Butchers' Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., Ill U.S. 746, 761-62 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring)
(upholding Louisiana's new constitution, which abolished all monopolies, including the Crescent City Co. of
Slaughter-House fame: Monopolies violate common-law rights that "enable men to maintain themselves and
their families"); Or. Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1873) (noting that the
doctrine under which agreements in restraint of trade are illegal is supported by "the injury to the party himself
by being precluded from pursuing his occupation and thus being prevented from supporting himself and his
family"); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 104 (noting that the source of the common law's
antipathy to monopolies was "their interference with the liberty of the subject to pursue for his maintenance
and that of his family any lawful trade or employment") (Field, J., dissenting).
202 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897).
203 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 694 (1895) (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing that
differential treatment was justified inter alia by the protection of families).
HOME ON THE RANGE
Three features of the Court's treatment of the relationship between family
and the right to livelihood stand out. First, a conventional rights-oriented view
of livelihood-that it might impose limits on governmental action-was not
the predominant theme of the Court's general jurisprudence of the family.
Even when that theme was present in particular opinions, its reach was quite
constrained. It did not (yet) support a view of family as partially autonomous
from governmental control, a view that would emerge in the next century.
Second, when Justices linked the right of livelihood to family, they
consistently did so with the pregnant presumption that the right was a
concomitant of the common-law duty to support one's family. In short, it was
a right (and obligation) of men, not women. Hence, despite the Court's
exquisite sensitivity to the value of practicing law in other contexts, the Court
upheld the power of a state to deny categorically to women licenses to practice
law;2'04 Justice Bradley's notorious concurrence invoked the domestic function
of women to justify this result: "The paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of
the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases."2 5
Implicit in Bradley's conception was the role of woman as moral guardian and
educator.
Third, preserving this place for women was one reason the Court
acknowledged-even cheered-a power in Congress, the territories, and the
states to prohibit polygamy on the frontier:
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and
Christian countries. They are crimes by the laws of the United
States, and they are crimes by the laws of Idaho. They tend to
destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of
families, to degrade woman, and to debase man. . . . To extend
exemption from punishment for such crimes would be to shock the




204 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1870). It is also worth noting that the Court was willing to permit
discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, and/or marital status where the right of livelihood was
concerned. The Court did so, moreover, for reasons related to familial form. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1889) (justifying restrictions on Chinese laborers: "Not being
accompanied by families, except in rare instances, their expenses were small; and .. . [t]he competition
between them and our people was for this reason altogether in their favor").
205 Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141-42.
206 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890).
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Plainly, protecting women was only part of the Court's calculus. Also integral
was an express desire to reinforce a particular moral view of the relation
between spouses. Coupled with this moral view was a political notion:
Family-specifically, the monogamous nuclear family-was essential to the
well-constituted society. "[Plolygamy," said the Court with no apparent sense
of irony, "leads to the patriarchal principle .... which, when applied to large
communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle [of
despotism] cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.,
20 7
[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary
in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to take rank as one
of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks to establish it on
the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the
union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the
sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best
guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent
progress in social and political improvement.
208
We have already seen that such sentiments were not confined to cases
involving plural marriage. The thrust of the Court's reasoning in Maynard v.
Hill, for example, was that marriage
is not so much the result of private agreement as of public ordination.
In every enlightened government it is pre-eminently the basis of civil
institutions, and thus an object of the deepest public concern. In this
light, marriage is more than a contract. . . . It is a great public
institution, giving character to our whole civil polity.
9
Nor, of course, was such reasoning confined to the Court. Kent's
Commentaries affirmed that the nuclear family was the best instrument for the• 210
transmission of social values to succeeding generations. But the
207 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
208 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (upholding an act of Congress denying polygamists the
right to vote). See also Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66, which states:
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is, nevertheless, in most civilized nations,
a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of
its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is
necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous marriages are
allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of the people, to a greater or less
extent, rests.
209 125 U.S. 190, 213 (1888) (citations omitted).
210 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 195 (O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., 12th ed. 1884).
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constitutional significance of family was intensified by the radical challenge
polygamy posed to social convention and by Congress's perception that a
particular form of social order must underwrite the establishment of
constitutional order in the territories. Family, properly conceived, helped
generate those "natural sentiments and affections" that tie people to home and
211country.
In sum, the Court's approach to family exhibited four characteristics. First,
it embraced all three of constitutionalism's substantive domains-economic,
moral, and political. Second, the Court integrated its conceptions of the three
domains in a way that confined its affirmation of family to a particular form-
monogamous and (despite the Court's occasional self-description) patriarchal.
Third, the Court was occasionally conflicted about the character of family's
importance. The claim in Meister v. Moore, for example, that marriage was "a
thing of common right," antecedent to the Constitution and positive law,• 212
created by agreement of the parties, could not easily be squared with that of
Maynard v. Hill, that the marital family was "a creation of law," "always
regulated by government," and "not so much the result of private agreement as
of public ordination.""' Fourth, despite the conflict, the principle of Maynard
proved more enduring and potent than Meister's, with respect to both
conventional and nonconforming families, at least in the nineteenth century.
The Court's tendency, therefore, was to treat family not so much as a private
sphere as a relationship whose finest aspects were constituted and regulated by
law.
2. Women As Educators and Moral Guardians
The Court's unabashed embrace of monogamy and a version of patriarchy
reinforced traditional notions of familial relations long embedded in common
law.214 It also confirmed family's moral function in at least two respects: (1)
forms of family that deviated from the Court's model were considered
dangerous to social morality and political order and therefore were punishable
211 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 524 (1893).
212 96 U.S. 76, 81 (1877).
213 125 U.S. at 211,213.
214 On this aspect of the common law's content, at least, we may trust William Blackstone. For discussion
of the common law's commitment to monogamy, see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF ENGLAND *424 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1979) (1765) (noting that a contract for marriage in which one of the
parties had "another husband or wife living" was not only void, but a felony). For the common law's
commitment to patriarchy, see 1 id., at 430-33, 440-42 (describing the doctrine of coverture and the husband-
father's authority over both children and wife).
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as crimes; (2) restrictions on women's economic capacity fortified a
conception of their role as moral guardian and educator. This latter
consideration supplied a bridge between ancient common-law tropes and an
emerging bourgeois sense of both family and women.
Carl N. Degler argues that the "modem American family emerged first in
the years between the American Revolution and about 1830. '' 2-5 In fact, this
216change was under way before the Revolution. But whatever its temporal
origins in North America, "modem" families exhibited at least three
characteristics. First, they tended to be initiated by the free choice of the
prospective partners and maintained through "affection and mutual respect"
between them. In short, the relationship partook of individualism, contract,
and love. Over the course of the nineteenth century, these elements




Second, modem marriage began to deviate from patriarchy to this limited
extent: men and women occupied separate spheres of life-husbands over
work and production and politics, wives over home and reproduction and
218morality. Plainly these spheres were not entirely distinct, not least because
the husband inhabited both, the wife typically only the domestic. The
husband's presence in the domestic domain usually meant that the wife's
authority was circumscribed. But, if the ethos of domesticity mattered, "the
wife, as mistress of the home, was perceived by society and herself as the
moral superior of the husband, though his legal and social inferior.
2 19
215 CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
PRESENT 8 (1980).
216 See Brandon, supra note 5, at 1206-10.
217 See DEGLER, supra note 215, at 8-15, 168.
218 Tocqueville, among others, noted that Americans maintained distinct spheres for men and women and
that both were viewed as equally worthy. See 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 45, pt. 3, at 576 stating:
Thus Americans do not believe that man and woman have the duty or the right to do the same
things, but they show the same esteem for the role of each of them, and they consider them as
beings whose value is equal although their destiny differs. They do not give the same form or the
same employment to the courage of woman as to that of man, but they never doubt her courage;
and if they deem that man and his mate should not always employ their intelligence and reason in
the same manner, they at least judge that the reason of one is as sure as that of the other, and her
intelligence as clear.
See also 2 id. pt. 3, at 565-73. For a more recent (and less enthusiastic) account of the doctrine of separate
spheres and the domestic mission of women, see Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood. 1820-1860,
18 AM. Q. 151, 151-74 (1966). For a discussion that extends the notion of women's domestic and civilizing
mission westward, see DEE BROWN, THE GENTLE TAMERS: WOMEN OF THE OLD WILD WEST (1958).
219 DEGLER, supra note 215, at 8, 28.
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Third, children began to occupy a new and special place in the life of the
family. Adults began to perceive of the child as a different sort of creature,
"more innocent." Children were valuable in themselves and not simply as
vessels for the transmission of wealth, as instruments of production, or as
devices for extending familial influence. And "childhood itself was perceived
. . . as a period of life not only worth recognizing and cherishing but
extending." In a way that John Locke would have applauded, a basic function
of family was now to care for and nurture children, to educate them in practical
industry and morals. And the person in charge of this function, according to
220the doctrine of separate spheres, was the wife and mother.
This doctrine cut against two traditional common law notions. First, the
husband-father possessed comprehensive authority over the home, including
the care of children; this authority grew out of his primary legal responsibility
as provider and caretaker (though it also entitled him to the benefits of his
children's labor). Second, the wife-mother was "entitled to no power [over her
children], but only to reverence and respect.
2
1
If the doctrine of separate spheres was, from the perspective of many
women, an advance over the common law, it too was problematic, in part
because it had such a powerful hold on the popular imagination. One reason
for this was that it integrated seamlessly into emerging cultural conceptions of
the proper role of "the modem woman." In an essay that has engendered a
large amount of scholarship on the subject, Barbara Welter mined various
forms of nineteenth-century popular American literature-especially novels
and the new genre of women's magazines-to uncover a consistent ideal
depiction of women's role. Welter characterized the depiction as "the Cult of
True Womanhood.", 222 Rooted in religion, the Cult itself was quasi-religious in
character. It depicted women as saints of society. Their virtues were "piety,
purity, submissiveness, and domesticity." Their principal role was to preserve
223civilization, whose moral roots were divinely sanctioned.
220 id. at 9, 66, 144.
221 See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 214, at *434-41, *453. One more ancient notion was sacrificed. Upon
dissolution of a marriage, the father was traditionally presumed to be the fit custodian of his children. In the
early-to-mid-nineteenth century, however, this presumption began gradually to give way to a countervailing
presumption-that the mother by nature was the fitter parent, at least with respect to children of tender years.
See Helms v. Franciscus, 2 B1. Ch. 544 (Md. 1830).
222 See Welter, supra note 218.
223 id. at 151-52.
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This was no small burden. That fact aside, the doctrine of separate spheres
(including the Cult that it underwrote) was susceptible to two sorts of criticism.
For one thing, it functioned as a kind of nineteenth-century version of Leave It
to Beaver. That is, it was too neat and clean to describe the experience of
many families, especially those that were not of a certain class. For another,
the image conjured by the doctrine, liberalizing though it was, was confining.
Hence, at mid-century Margaret Fuller could invoke biblical sources and extol
women's domestic virtues, while insisting on "the emancipation of Woman
from the burdens and disabilities" that tend "to merge her individuality" into
family.224 She urged, therefore, that all occupations be opened to women and
argued that promoting women's independence would strengthen their
connection to men, because doing so would reinforce the interests the sexes
hold in common. 25 She suggested that women's emancipation, their "liberty"
226as she also called it, would come through law.
Both sets of criticisms were apt, even in the East, where the rhetorical
tropes of liberalism and civilization were most potent. But the criticisms
would acquire special force in the West, and their normative vitality would
derive not, as Fuller had hoped, principally through law, but from the harsh
experience of families on the frontier.
D. The Political Fruit of Homes on the Range
1. Families, Law, and Constitution
Lawrence M. Friedman argues that westward settlers carried the law with
them. Thus, on the journey, although they "were outside any formal
institutions of law and order ... the wagon trains and emigration companies
were surprisingly lawful in behavior. '2 7 "Out in the trackless wilderness,
hundreds of miles from police, courts, and judges, the fundamental rules of
property and contract were followed, just as they were in Illinois or
Massachusetts." The persistence not simply of a legal sensibility but of
concrete legal norms, he says, was a function of habit and necessity. In transit
"and in the midst of strangers, there was hardly an opportunity for new
'customs' to develop. The 'law' that prevailed was 'the taught, learned,
224 MARGARET FULLER OSSOLI, WOMAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, AND KINDRED PAPERS RELATING
TO THE SPHERE, CONDITION, AND DUTIES OF WOMAN 5-9 (Lohn P. Jewett & Co. 1855).
225 Id. at 169-76.
226 Id. at 14.
227 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 363 (2d ed. 1985).
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accepted customs' of the people; it was part of the baggage they brought with
them., 228 Even more strongly, Friedman argues that "[t]he immigrants were
Americans, who 'tacitly' brought common law with them to an empty
country. ' 29  Once settled, he argues, the new inhabitants rigged a rough
combination of old and new legal norms. The persistence of old norms in new
settlements may have been due partly to the settlers' ethical "baggage," but
other explanations may be even more powerful. For one thing, Congress had
authority to establish policy in the territories and to regulate the admission of
territories into the Union as states. 230 For another, some territories were carved
from existing states, whose enactments were transplanted onto the territories.
Finally, territorial settlement attracted lawyers. If they did not always meet the
highest standards of the profession-in terms of ethics or ability-they
nonetheless practiced modes of thought and argument that reinforced the reach
231of law in territories.
The theme of Friedman's picture is that westward settlement and the
establishment of law were coextensive and simultaneous. The point, where
family is concerned, is that migrant families strongly resembled their Eastern
counterparts, both because of the ethical habits of immigrants and because of
the normative constraints of law. There is much to these claims; but it would
be a mistake to make too much of them, especially where family is concerned.
In fact, as we shall see, families on the frontier frequently looked different
from those back East. This was the case not only in transit but also after
settlement. One reason is that the frontier's harsh conditions posed challenges
that defied solution through habitual modes of behavior or established
categories of law. In short, necessity incited innovation. Another reason is
that, if law accompanied or even preceded the immigrants, its influence on the
frontier was comparatively diffuse. This was because, in many places,
effective formal institutions of law were weak or nonexistent. Both
environmental exigency and the inadequacy of law permitted-in some
228 Id. at 364 (citing JOHN PHILLIP REID, LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT: PROPERTY AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR ON
THE OVERLAND TRAIL 362 (1980)).
229 Id. This claim is problematic on three fronts: its assumption that the land was "empty" overlooks the
presence of Indians and others who inhabited much of the territory; the claim that migrants were "Americans"
overlooks the sometimes complex allegiances and identities that many settlers brought with them; and the
claim that they carried the common law may assume too much about the precise content of the norms to which
they adhered.
230 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. Congress exercised such authority, even before the Constitution's adoption,
through the Northwest Ordinance.
231 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 227, at 163-65, 365.
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respects compelled-families to make their way in their own way, as best they
could, in a sometimes hostile world. If this were not a state of nature (of either
a Hobbesian or a Lockean variety), neither was it a condition comprehensively
ordered by law. This condition produced subtle shifts in relations and
expectations within the marital family. Those shifts involved the respective
roles of wives and husbands; and they suggested a view of marriage rooted less
firmly in legal status, more strongly in contract.
2. Unconventional Roles
12
People's motives for moving West were many. For men at least, a
prominent motive was economic: They wanted their own land from which to
support themselves and their families. 233 For women, motivations were less
straightforward, sometimes more conflicted. Certainly, some wanted to go for
economic reasons, to pursue prosperity or flee failure. Some sought a better,
healthier climate. A few-some men, too-may have harbored romantic
visions of life in the West. Many, perhaps most, went to preserve their
families. The aim in this respect was not entirely altruistic, for many, faced
with husbands bent on going, mistrusted their untethered mates or feared their
own loneliness. Some, no doubt, were propelled by affection for their spouses.
Wives of ministers frequently accompanied their husbands with an
234appropriately missionary zeal, to claim the West for God and goodness. In
general, however, women were far less enthusiastic than men about moving.235
Some wives blocked their husbands' plans to emigrate. One suspects,
however, that most did not, even if they had wanted to do so. Some apparently
used resistance as a means for negotiating terms for emigration, including the
husbands' accepting "familial responsibilities" as part of the bargain.236
One thing is certain: Women went West in large numbers. Census data
indicate that many men went first on their own, soon followed by wives or
fianc6es. Single women, too, went West, especially after the first wave of
settlement; few who wanted to marry found themselves single for long. But
wives frequently accompanied their husbands and brought their children. One
reason for all of these trends was that men could not fulfill their economic
232 1 confine my focus here to agrarian settlement in what we now think of as the greater Midwest. Hence,
I do not attend to urban settlement, mining communities, the "fur frontier," or the explorers' frontier.
233 JOHN MACK FARAGHER, WOMEN AND MEN ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL 16 (1979).
234 JULIE ROY JEFFREY, FRONTIER WOMEN: ,,CIVILIZING" THE WEST? 1840-1880, at 40-47 (1998).
235 See DEGLER, supra note 215, at 47.
236 See JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 42.
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ambition alone. They needed help. In Aristotelian terms, the household, not
the individual, was the smallest economic unit capable of self sufficiency on
the frontier. The sensible assumption was that "married persons are generally
more comfortable, and succeed better, in a frontier country, than single men;
for a wife and family, so far from being a burden to a western farmer, may
always prove a source of pecuniary advantage in the domestic economy of his
household. ' '237 Much more frequently than not, then, migration was a familial
231
affair, often an extended familial affair.
For those who journeyed as a family, the westward trek was a severe test of
established roles in the marital relationship and of the marriage itself. The trek
both reinforced and challenged aspects of the Eastern template for familial
roles. Certain obligations that had been the province of women before the
journey-like cooking, making and mending clothes, caring for children, and
of course giving birth-remained so in transit. 239  But harsh conditions
impelled departures from convention. Some duties that women took on, as
when they performed presumptively masculine tasks like pitching tents, yoking
cattle, and loading, unloading, and driving wagons, positively defied
convention; and a few of the new responsibilities, like collecting buffalo chips
for fuel, were not only unfeminine but distasteful.240  Men, too, flouted a few
conventions-by washing clothes and cooking, for example-but, on the
evidence available, most men seem to have done so irregularly and out of a
masculine sense of courtesy.24' On the surface, these changes were so subtle as
to seem insignificant, but they bespoke an altered sense of the marital family,
not simply as a status, but as a kind of partnership, whose members' roles were
somewhat fluid, set partially through pragmatic accommodation.
After settlement, some of these unconventional practices persisted,
especially during the earliest years, sometimes longer. As on the trail, if the
diaries are accurate, women were more likely than men to take on new roles.4'
237 GLENDA RILEY, FEMALE FRONTIER: THE COMPARATIVE VIEW OF WOMEN ON THE PRAIRIE AND THE
PLAINS 18 (1988) (quoting JOHN B. NEWHALL, GLIMPSE OF IOWA IN 1846, at 62 (1957)).
238 See JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 39; GLENDA RILEY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA (1973).
239 JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 51-52.
240 Id. at 54,56; GLENDA RILEY, WOMEN ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 3 (1977).
241 See JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 57. There were other changes en route, with respect to both the
mundane and the sublime. For example, most women eventually modified or abandoned Eastern standards of
feminine dress; some took to wearing bloomers. Id. at 50-51, 55-56. And many families were forced to
sacrifice ritual and leisure on the Sabbath, which Jeffrey argues "had become by mid-century a symbol of
women's religious and moral authority." id. at 54-55.
242 Id. at 78; SANDRA L. MYRES, WESTERING WOMEN AND THE FRONTIER EXPERIENCE, 1800-1915, at 171
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To be sure, much of what women did on the homestead remained recognizably
women's work. They washed and cooked and cared for children. 43  But they
also hunted, chopped wood, plowed fields, and carried guns-all of which
distinguished them from most of their more civilized sisters back East.2
When their husbands were away, which was not infrequently, wives assumed
responsibility for managing the entire homestead, not merely the home.245
Women assumed responsibilities outside the home as well. Teaching was
one job that fit the conventional feminine responsibility for educating the
young. But other activities, like commercial entrepreneurship (of the petit-
bourgeois variety) or substitute preaching, were distinctly nontraditional. 24' As
Deborah Fink puts it, "farm wives' labor placed them in the thick of the
production economy,, 247 rudimentary though that economy was. This did not
mean that women were developing a mentality (or status) resembling that of
men;24' but women's labor did reinforce relationships of mutual dependence
and partnership between husbands and wives, relationships at odds with the
Eastern model of strictly segregated spheres and domesticated wives.249 Both
within and outside the family, women pursued new outlets for labor while
retaining one important responsibility that Locke had prescribed and that
(1982).
243 Elizabeth Jameson, Women As Workers, Women As Civilizers: True Womanhood in the American
West, in THE WOMEN'S WEST (Susan Armitage & Elizabeth Jameson eds., 1987). John Mack Faragher argues
that, with few exceptions, labor on the frontier was strictly segregated by sex. "Midwestern society," he says,
"had a developed sense of gender distinction. The existence of a strict division of labor and separate cultural
character models for men and women suggests that significant portions of men's and women's time were spent
in the company of their own sex." FARAGHER, supra note 233, at 110. While there is no denying the sexual
segregation of much labor on the frontier, Faragher overstates its strictness. Moreover, as I try to show below,
he claims too much (or too little) when he asserts that "women played no part in public life." Id.
244 RILEY, supra note 237, at 53.
245 JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 78.
246 Id. at 78-80.
247 DEBORAH FINK, AGRARIAN WOMEN: WIVES AND MOTHERS IN RURAL NEBRASKA, 1880-1940, at 60
(1992); MARY ELLEN JONES, DAILY LIFE ON THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN FRONTIER 193 (1998).
248 Compare JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 81-84, 90-93, with RILEY, supra note 237, at 53.
249 See Katherine Harris, Homesteading in Northeastern Colorado, 1873-1920: Sex Roles and Women's
Experience, in THE WOMEN'S WEST, supra note 243, at 165-67. Harris recites three classic "pre-industrial"
familial forms: evangelical (rigidly hierarchical and male-dominated), genteel (hierarchical, but with a
functional role for women), and moderate (less hierarchical, with greater sharing of roles). She claims that
familial variation was even more complex in the nineteenth-century United States, but suggests that Eastern
families (at least of certain classes) tended toward the model of gentility, while families on the frontier tended
toward the moderate model. Id. at 175-76. 1 suspect that Harris exaggerates the level of sexual equality in
homesteading families, but the tendencies she observes seem accurate. See also Joann Vanek, Work, Leisure,
and Family Roles: Farm Households in the United States, 1920-1955, 5 J. FAM. HIST. 422, 423 (1980)
("[S]tudies ... show that a kind of symmetry [between husbands and wives] had occurred.. . in the household
mode of production of preindustrial economies and in an agrarian past.").
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Eastern notions of domesticity had delegated to wives: the practical,
250
intellectual, and moral education of children.
3. Western Families and Constitutionalist Functions
Homesteads on the frontier seemed to vindicate the agrarian-republican
conception of the constitution of politics. Households provided the means for
material subsistence; connections among households created communities;
communities produced what came to resemble a collective way of life; that
way of life, in turn, was the locus for an incipient form of politics. This was a
politics with a difference, however, for its ultimate aim was not the organic
creation of an autochthonous state but the formation of bonds of a particular,
preordained sort with a preexisting nation-state. This aim and the means for
achieving it made Westerners directly reliant on the nation, not least because
the very presence of homesteads and homesteaders was due to the largesse-
not to mention the military, economic, and imperial ambition-of the United
States. If homesteaders were dependent on the nation, however, they also
found themselves in conflict with it, especially with the Hamiltonian
tendencies of its political economy. This ideological antagonism would
become a political movement, which traced its roots to Jeffersonian• - 251
republicanism. One catalyst for this conversion was the frontier family.
What might explain family's participation in the movement to challenge
the dominant political economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century?
Perhaps women's contribution to material production on the homestead
permitted wives to "relegate their second-class status to the fringes of their
reality," thus converting economic power into familial power and then into
252
political power. Alternatively, perhaps "sharing between the sexes,"
especially with respect to the rearing of children, promoted an intrafamilial
equality that "enhanced female status and autonomy," which underwrote
250 See JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 87-90; MYRES, supra note 242, at 182-85.
251 There were both commonalities and differences between Western agrarianism and the variety of
agrarian republicanism that had traditionally resided in the South. One common element was a distrust of
capital. In Southern agrarianism, this distrust was connected to Locke's notion of property: a property in one's
person was primary; abstract or artificial forms of property were secondary. See ANNE NORTON,
ALTERNATIVE AMERICAS: A READING OF ANTEBELLUM POLITICAL CULTURE 124-27 (1986). One notable
exception to the principle of property in one's person, of course, was slavery.
252 FINK, supra note 247, at 60-61 (extrapolating from a twentieth-century study of agrarian households:
Sarah Elbert, The Farmer Takes a Wife: Women in America's Farming Families, in WOMEN, HOUSEHOLDS,
AND THE ECONOMY 173, 191-95 (Lourdes Beneria & Catharine R. Stimpson eds., 1987)).
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women's public activity in the community.53 Each of these accounts is
problematic. For one thing, with respect to women's power, status, and
autonomy, the accounts seem too happy to be entirely accurate. For another,
they rest too heavily on a single causal element; social change is typically more
complex, multifaceted, and multidirectional than any single variable can
explain. But, if we weaken the assumptions and complicate the causal
connections, it does seem true that subtle shifts in women's roles produced
political consequences of some significance.
As noted above, there was in "modem" America an ethos that
254acknowledged a role for women in maintaining morality in society.
According to the doctrine of separate spheres, this role was confined within the
home. In the West, however, the role extended beyond those bounds. This
extension was not simply a function of the fact that women on the frontier
became (properly) teachers."' It grew, moreover, from a sentiment that
women had a general responsibility for "civilizing" society and for doing so
even outside the confines of the home.256
Second, therefore, the process of creating communities on the frontier was
one in which women were intimately involved. In part, this involvement was a
natural outgrowth of the fact that creating community entailed establishing
connections among families, in which women had an undeniable role. But
even in established communities, women had an active and visible role in the
communities' associational life. This was certainly the case for informal
activities like dances, barn raisings, quilting bees, and communal
257butcherings. It was also true for more formal institutions and voluntary
associations, especially those, like schools and churches that fell within
women's acknowledged ambit."' But, especially after the Civil War, it was
true even of associations residing within more conventionally masculine
domains like farming and politics. Among these associations were the Grange
and the Farmers' Alliance, whose aims included promoting agriculture, as an
economic venture and a way of life, and protecting it against what the
253 Harris, supra note 249, at 167.
254 See JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 107-08.
255 See MYRES, supra note 242, at 182-85.
256 See JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 98.
257 See JONES, supra note 247, at 204.
258 JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 98, 107-23.
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organizations saw as the predations of capital in general and the railroads in
259particular.
Typically, women's connection to men's associations was through
auxiliaries of the principal organization. Thus, women occupied a separate
space for social and other appropriately feminine pursuits. But the Grange
and the Alliance admitted women as members, officers, and delegates to
conventions. Elizabeth Jameson notes that the Alliance encouraged women's
membership "because they had a direct economic interest in reform."26' The
source of that interest, of course, was the microeconomy that was the familial
household. The Alliance, in fact, presented itself as an extension and
embodiment of the farming family. "And like the farm family, the Alliance
offered a productive role for every member of the household. Its leaders
assumed that mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters would reproduce within the
•.. organization the cooperative model of family labor found on the farm. 262
The goal was not simply to reform national policy, but to transform the family
itself. "If the family was a microcosm of the country, then the family had to
be transformed, 'improved,' and all its members remade into model citizens."
The instrument for this transformation was education-for all the family's
members.263
As Michael Lewis Goldberg points out, although the Alliance's rhetoric
and its metaphorical uses of family insinuated sexual equality, the association
was not able to sustain the insinuation. Egalitarian commitment was
compromised most profoundly, he argues, in the move to the Populist Party as
a vehicle for political action in the late 1880s and early 1890s. In short, men
controlled the party.264 This control made a certain sense, in light of the party's
strategic emphasis on electoral politics; women, after all, could not vote in
most places and times that were relevant. But the effect was to exclude women
from the central mission of the organization-a mission that implicated one of
265the basic duties of citizenship. Perhaps as important, the Populists altered
the Alliance's familial metaphor from one of equality and inclusion to one of
masculine supremacy, to which the husband's common-law duty of support
259 Jameson, supra note 243, at 157.
260 JONES, supra note 247, at 209.
261 Jameson, supra note 243, at 157.
262 MICHAEL LEWIS GOLDBERG, AN ARMY OF WOMEN: GENDER AND POLITICS IN GILDED AGE KANSAS
130 (1997).
263 Id. at 131-52 (citing KANSAS FARMER, Sept. 4, 1889).
264 Id. at 142, 160-63.
265 id. at 168.
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was central. The reason that corporate exploitation and governmental
corruption were so dangerous, the new argument went, was that they
undermined the ability of husbands and fathers to provide for their families."'
Thus, the party's strategic aim and method tended to push women back to an
auxiliary role.
The Populist Party also compromised agrarian republicanism's traditional
orientation toward localism. Although the party had "grassroots," its agenda
was nationalist. This made sense for at least three reasons. First, as noted
above, homesteaders west of the Mississippi were connected directly to the
nation in ways that settlers in older states back East had not been. According
to the Constitution, congressional statute, and the explicit acquiescence of
states, the territories belonged to and were subject to regulation by the
267nation. Thus, the policies that permitted, even encouraged, western
settlement were national in origin and purpose. Second, the principal levers of
political economy were national. This was due in no small part to the power of
Hamiltonianism as a description of and prescription for many aspects of the
regime, especially after the Civil War. To put a sharper point on it, if
Populism's enemies were national corporations possessing substantial
economic power, the remedies must be national as well. Third, the
circumstances that propelled Populism as a political movement in the late
1880s and early 1890s-high interest rates, falling prices for farm products,
failed farms and foreclosures on mortgages, and the Panic of 1893-were
beyond local control.
Populism's platform rested on this central premise: Primary authority over
the political economy was vested not in enterprise (the "millionaires") but in
"the people." The political justification for this position was that democracy
demanded it. The people presupposed by this version of democracy, however,
were not merely a local (nor necessarily an agrarian) people, but a national
people, rural and urban. The economic justification returned to John Locke's
labor theory of ownership, but turned it against Hamilton's abstract political
economy. Wealth, the platform stated, is created by labor and "belongs to him
266 Id. at 165.
267 This proposition had been thrown into question by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and by Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). The former enacted Stephen A. Douglas's theory that the
people of each territory were sovereign and should be permitted to legislate (with respect to slavery, for
example) free from Congressional interference. The logic of Dred Scott, in contrast, implied that neither
Congress nor the territories could interfere with a slaveholder's right to take his property wherever he pleased.
Union victory in the Civil War implicitly but effectively overturned both notions. For a discussion of these
claims, see BRANDON, supra note 32, at 80-81, 109-18.
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who creates it." Capitalists, who siphon wealth from its creators, commit
"robbery," straight and simple."' Almost all the remedies the Populists
proposed aimed to enhance governmental presence in the economy-through
nationalization of crucial industries, federally-financed low-interest loans,
postal savings banks, a graduated income tax, and monetary policies like
269unlimited coinage of silver.
Populism's cause would be coopted by the Democrats, most vividly in the
elections of 1896, in which William Jennings Bryan was crucified. After this,
the movement's war against capital and the railroads went moribund. There
is reason to believe, however, that the agrarian movements that gave rise to
Populism helped Western women enjoy at least two important entrees into
traditionally masculine preserves. The first concerned higher education.
Western territories and states embraced coeducation far sooner than those back
East, though it is also true that most coeducational institutions prescribed
segregated courses of study for women and men-the former being directed to
courses related to teaching and the economy of the home, the latter to other,
broader studies."'
The second entree involved suffrage. Partly through women's
associational activities (including their work in the prosuffrage Women's
Christian Temperance Union) and partly through the active agitation of theSr 272
Populists, women first acquired the right to vote in the West. The reasons
for these successes are complex. Jameson argues that support for suffrage
came not from among men of the "genteel upper classes" but from "farmers
and miners who endorsed political philosophies that supported equality." '273
Although there is something to this position, the record is actually more
tangled and, in some respects, less idealistic. In Wyoming, for example,
268 Populist Party Platform (July 4, 1892), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 593-94 (Henry Steele
Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 1988).
269 Id. at 594-95.
270 Certain tenets of the movement were later revived in two forms. Socialist parties and organizations,
which were a presence in parts of the Midwest in the first forty years of the twentieth century, picked up part
of the Populist mantle. And New-Deal liberalism pursued and enacted some policies that the Populists had
originally embraced.
271 JEFFREY, supra note 234, at 227, 234-36.
272 Women acquired suffrage soon after the Civil War-first in Wyoming (1869), then in Utah (1870).
For a brief discussion of legislative battles over suffrage in the West, see MYRES, supra note 242, at 213-37.
By 1914, women had acquired the right to vote in ten of eleven Western states, but only one state in the East.
273 Jameson, supra note 243, at 157. She points out, for example, that the Populists in the 1890s
successfully promoted suffrage in Colorado and Idaho, but failed in California and Kansas where "the
countryside voted for suffrage, but urban voters defeated it." id.
20031
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
proponents had a variety of motives: some wanted to embarrass the Republican
governor, who they mistakenly thought would veto the measure; others argued
that the measure would attract more women to the territory (which at the time
had 6,107 males and 1,049 women over the age of 10).274 In Utah, extending
the suffrage was promoted most zealously by a member of Congress from
Indiana, who argued that if women had the right to vote in the West, they
would discourage sexual promiscuity and outlaw polygamy.275
Perhaps the most we can confidently say is that, in the states that were
manufactured from the frontier, certain political actors saw their interests to be
congruent with women's. These were not always high-minded motives, to be
sure. But two possible lessons stand out, one concerning constitutional values,
the other concerning the constitutionalist function of family. First, it is notable
that actors-men, for the most part-who wanted something for themselves
pursued their own gain by promoting a version of constitutional liberty and
equality for others. Second, and more modestly, perhaps the fact that these
actors perceived women to be worthy or useful political partners-on the
model of the marital family on the frontier-was something of an achievement
in itself.
CONCLUSION
Frederick Jackson Turner argued that the driving forces and political legacy
of westward settlement were individualism, democracy, and nationalism."'
Their importance is undeniable, even if we might quibble over what they
entail. There was, however, another force whose constitutional legacy Turner
undervalued. Family on the frontier was an intermediate association, neither
liberal nor democratic, that refined both liberalism and democracy, while
extending the authority of the nation.
In functional terms, nineteenth-century families on the frontier did not play
the subversive and radically creative roles their eighteenth-century colonial
counterparts had played. Perhaps this should come as no surprise; for, despite
the presence of familial forms and practices that deviated from what was
increasingly considered the conventional norm, families by the nineteenth
century were fairly well rationalized as part of constitutional order. Even on
274 MYRES, supra note 242, at 220-21.
275 Id. at 221-23.
276 TURNER, supra note 18, at 35.
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the frontier-where environmental challenges were substantial and legal and
social constraints were thin-these were republican families, emulating their
eighteenth-century prototypes. Their arduous role was not to revise the
political world, but to secure the United States' military conquests over Indians
and Mexicans. They would accomplish this purpose by serving as social and
political instruments for extending the nation's political authority over the
conquered territories.
For many reasons, these families were largely ineffective in limiting the
Hamiltonian elements of American political economy. This failure was not for
lack of trying. Many families on the frontier, especially in parts of what we
now call the upper Midwest and the Great Plains, were active participants in
social and political movements whose aim was to challenge, in the name of an
agrarian republicanism identified with Jefferson, the individualist and
centralizing tendencies that Tocqueville feared. By the end of the century,
however, the Hamiltonian logic of political economy was too powerful to resist
successfully.
If Western families failed in this respect, they succeeded in another
unexpected direction, and did so in ways that challenged the masculine
presuppositions of the common law and the Supreme Court. To be sure, the
West did not liberate women. But it did work substantial change, largely
without the aid of law, as environmental and ethical conditions impelled
women to take on new roles in families, communities, and the larger society.
At first, these roles were informal and social in character. Later, they were
formal and overtly political. Eventually, they solidified two entitlements of
significance for Western women: expansive access to higher education and the
right to vote. As a matter of constitutional text and doctrine, the question of
women's status in the nation as a whole would not be fully joined until well
into the twentieth century, long after the frontier ceased to be. But, even if the
West did not liberate women, the experience of families on the frontier was
something of a start.
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